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COMMENTARII HISTORICI

ANTONIO POSSEVINO, Sol.
AS PAPAL MEDIATOR BETWEEN
EMPEROR RUDOLF II AND KING STEPHAN BATHORY
JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY,

SJ. -

MARQUETrE UNIVERSITY, MILWAUKEE!.

THE ORIGINS OF THE DISPUTE

Conflicting claims to territory can sometimes spark wars even though the
territories themselves are small and hardly touch the national life or economic
interests of the nations involved. The war between Argentina and the United
Kingdom over the Falkland Islands is an example. When such disputes have
arisen between Catholic kingdoms and nations, the Holy See has sometimes
been able to serve as a mediator in reaching a fair and amicable settlement. The
successful papal mediation (1979-1985) of a border dispute between Argentina
and Chile is a casein point. Understandably, disputes which resulted in fighting
have attracted far more attention from historians than have disputes settled by
negotiations. A territorial conflict poisoned relations between Rudolf II, Holy
Roman Emperor (1576-1612) and Stephan Bathory, Prince of Transylvania
(1571-1576) and King of Poland (1576-1586).
Contemporary documents usually refer to the territory in question as Szatmar (now Satu-Mare) and Nemethy, but several neighboring villages were also
included in the dispute. Szatmar, the main city involved, is now in Romania,
close to the point where Transylvania borders Hungary and the Ukraine. The
city, which was strongly fortified, was located in the sixteenth century on a small
island in the Somesul (Somes) River, a tributary of the Tisza River, which in
tum flows into the Danube. Nemethy lay just across the Somesul to the northeast
of Szatma~ .

1 I wish to thank Michael Zeps, S.l., Ryan Kelsey, and A. Lynn Martin for suggestions which
have improved this essay. A short version was delivered to the Sixteenth Century Studies Conference in SI. Louis, 1993.
2 There is an engraving of Szatmar (from 1689) in 1. DP,.BROWSKI, editor, Etienne Btitory: Roi
de Pologne, Prince de Transylvanie (Krakow 1935) 24. A comparison of modem maps with that
of Transylvania in G. DE lODE 'S, Speculum Orbis Terrarum (Antwerp 1578; reprinted Amsterdam 1965) Part II, map X, suggests that the course of the Some sui has shifted since the sixteenth
century. The Vatican Archives contain a large (four folio pages) hand-drawn map of the disputed
territories (reproduced at the end of this article); it is addressed to the Cardinal Secretary, Tolomeo Gallio (327v), in the autograph of Antonio Possevino, the papal legate and mediator of the
Szatmar dispute, probably early in 1582: Nunz. Germ. 93 327.
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Disputed territorial claims usually have complex roots. The controversy
over Szatmar and adjacent territories goes back to the Ottoman victory at the
Battle of Mohacs on 28 August 1526. Following their victory the Turks occupied most of Hungary. Meanwhile the majority of the Hungarian nobility elected
John Zapolya, the Prince of Transylvania to be their king, while a minority recognized the claims of the Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand, brother of Charles V
and King of Bohemia. When Charles V abdicated in 1556, Ferdinand became
Emperor Ferdinand I, but his Hungarian possessions were in fact confined to the
northern fringe of medieval Hungary, while the Ottomans controlled the vast
majority of the Kingdom. Ferdinand's army had defeated Zapolya 's troops in
1527 and forced him to flee to Poland in 1528. Zapolya's only hope was Ottoman support. In 1528 he received Turkish military support and recognition as
King of Hungary. He died in 1540 and was succeeded by his infant son, John
Sigismund. In 1540 and 1541 Turkish troops occupied most of the Hungarian
territory which Zapolya had ruled, but they did recognize John .Sigismund as
Prince of Transylvania, which he continued to rule under Ottoman overlordship
until his death in 1571. His elected successor was Stephan Bathory, who was
Prince of Transylvania from 1571 to 1576 and King of Poland from 1576 until
his death in 1586 3 .
Szatmar and its adjacent villages were minuscule compared to the vast Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, but the Szatmar territories were family lands for
Stephan Bathory, and he was deeply and personally involved in the events that
led to the Habsburg repossession of these lands. There is little doubt that their
loss to the Habsburgs represented for Bathory an affront to his honor both as a
Bathory and as Prince of Transylvania and King of Poland. In this dispute the
question of honor and traditional claims weighed far more than the economic or
military worth of the lands in dispute. Such claims generally loomed large in sixteenth century diplomacy. Although in these years Transylvania had a mixed
population of Hungarians, Romanians and Germans, considerations of nationality and ethnicity hatdly surfaced during the protracted negotiations between
Rudolf II and Bathory. In the Convention of Leles of 1543 Ferdinand had acknowledged Andrea, Christopher and Stephan Bathory as having dominion «oppldi Zathmar et Nemethy ac possessionum et villarum ad id pertinentium». Additional documents issued in 1544 and 1548 confirmed these family possessions 4 .
After the abdication of Charles V in 1556, the Transylvanian Diet recalled
John Sigismund from exile in Poland. It was Stephan Bathory who served as the
spokesman for the delegation that greeted the Prince as he crossed the border on
his return. But Ferdinand I was not inclined to accept a Transylvania independent of his Kingdom of Hungary and sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1556

3 Ferenc SzAKALY, The Early Ottoman Period, including Royal Hungary, in A History of
Hungary, edited by Peter SUGAR et aL (Bloomington 1990) 83-85.
4 The documents are cited and quoted by Antoine ALoAsY, La gemfalogie de la famille Bathory in Etienne Batory, 15.
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to assert his claims to Transylvania. Suleiman did not accept his claims, and war
broke out between John Sigismund and Ferdinand I in the spring of 1557. The
conflict, which nicely suited Ottoman purposes, was a series of sieges along the
forty fortresses that guarded the frontier. Truces broke the actual fighting in this
war, which dragged on from 1557 to 1567.
No fortress was more important than Szatmar, which John Sigismund put
under the command of Stephan Bathory. Bathory was defending not only his
country but his own personal estates. In the autumn of 1557 Habsburg troops besieged the fortress, but stout resistance and the approach of a Transylvanian
army forced them to retreat in December of 1557. Bathory then defended the
Tisza River line farther to the north until peace negotiations began in 1559-1560.
These reached ,a provisional agreement, but war broke out again in 1561 when
the leading Transylvanian general, Melchior Balassa, accepted bribes from Ferdinand I and deserted to the Imperial side.
Balassa's defection resulted in the Habsburg occupation of Szatmar in December of 1561. Meanwhile Bathory was engaged in defending the territory
along the Tisza and was able to recapture the fortress of Hadad, but Balassa led a
Habsburg counterattack which defeated Bathory and another Transylvanian general. Bathory himself was wounded in the fighting, and most of the Transylvanian army deserted. After the debacle many leading Transylvanians went over to
the Habsburgs and forced John Sigismund to enter peace negotiations: He was
willing to make concessions, but the Habsburgs deemed these insufficient. Two
Polish ambassadors served as intermediaries so that a truce was reached while
final negotiations dragged on. The sticking point was the districts drained by the
Tisza River, which were mostly under Habsburg occupation5 . The truce was
supposed to last until December of 1564, but fighting broke out during the summer, with the Habsburg forces under Balassa and the Transylvanian army under
Bathory. Bathory had entered into secret negotiations with inhabitants of Szatmar, who were restive under Balassa's heavy yoke. Bathory tricked Balassa's
forces into marching north while he cut south toward the Tisza Rivers and established contact with his partisans in Szatmar, who told him that the town was
lightly defended. After a long night's march his troops entered the town on 3
September and stormed the fortress, putting the German mercenaries who resisted to the sword. An added prize was the capture of Balassa's wife and children. Balassa was forced to ransom them from Bathory by surrendering three
more fortresses 6 •
These developments greatly angered the court at Vienna, now under Maximilian II (1564-1576), which regarded Szatmar as the key to controlling the territory along the Transylvanian border. The war continued as Bathory led the
Transylvanians to conquests reaching along the Tisza all the way to Cassovia
(Kassa, Kaschau, Kosice, today in Slovakia). Vienna reacted by recruiting a new

5 Emeric LUKINICH, La jeunesse d'Etienne Bathory (Etienne Bathory, prince de Transylvanie; in. Etienne Batory, 22-28.
Ibid., 28-30.
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army and launching an unexpected winter campaign which caught the Transylvanians unprepared.
In January 1565 the Habsburg army recovered all that it had lost. Discouraged, John Sigismund sued for peace. BlHhory was one of the two representatives that he sent to negotiate a preliminary treaty at Szatmar on March 13,
which ceded most of the territory along the frontier to Maximilian. All the territories outside of Transy lvania proper were recognized as constitutive parts of the
(Habsburg) Kingdom of Hungary and owing obedience to the Hungarian crown.
This Convention of Szatmar was only provisional, for the final treaty was to be
negotiated in Vienna. Again John Sigismund put BlHhory in charge of the negotiations with orders to seek concessions from the extreme measures of the Szatmar Convention. Bathory presented his Prince's request for mitigations, but
Maximilian refused to give up any of the gains awarded him by the Convention 7 •
John Sigismund had one obvious recourse to gain concessions. He sent an
embassy to Constantinople to enlist the support of his Turkish overlord.
Suleiman agreed and requested that Maximilian restore the conquests of the previous winter, threatening war if the Emperor refused. John Sigismund now felt
strong enough to disregard completely the Szatmar agreement and to demand a
totally fresh start to negotiations. In Vienna BlHhory had just begun his efforts to
gain mitigations of the Szatmar Convent jon when the new, uncompromising instructions arrived from his Prince. He presented these to the Imperial advisors on
14 May 1565. Maximilian was to restore all his recent conquests; in return John
Sigismund would make minor concessions. The Imperial counselors were outraged and considered BlHhory, not his Prince, the main sources of the fresh demands. Ignoring the 'traditional rights of an ambassador, they arrested BlHhory
on 5 June 1565 8 . They demanded to see his instructions and he complied; they
then demanded to see his further, secret instructions, but he had none and could
not comply. BlHhory remained a prisoner for two years, first at Vienna, later at
Prague. He devoted the two years to encyclopedic reading, an enjoyable pursuit
given his scholarly bent, but he could scarcely forget these two years of unjust
imprisonment when he became King of Poland. Both John Sigismund of Transylvania and Sigismund Augustus of Poland pleaded in vain for his release. His
release came only in 1567 when the new Sultan, Selim II, made it a condition for
giving a safe conduct to Imperial ambassadors who had to undertake negotiations with the Porte9 •
BlHhory returned to Transylvania to find John Sigismund under the domination of his chief minister, Caspar B6k6s. BlHhory was given command of
Varad but was excluded from influence. B6k6s was the main force behind new

Ibid., 30-3l.
On the immunities granted ambassadors in this period, see Garrett MATTIN GLY, Renaissance Diplomacy (Baltimore 1964) 39-44 233-244.
9 LUKlNICH 32-34; Antonio POSSEVlNO, Transilvania, edited by Endre VERESS (Budapest
1913) 99 100.
7

8

POSSEVINO AS PAPAL MEDIATOR

7

negotiations with the Imperial government during 1570, first at Prague, then at
Speyer. The Convention of Speyer, which regularized relations between the
Habsburg Kingdom of Hungary and Transylvania, not only dealt with control of
territory in the Tisza frontier region but also recognized the suzerainty of the
King of Hungary over all of Transylvania. Indeed, the Convention seemed to reduce Transylvania to a province of Hungary with its Prince acting as a governor
named by the King. Transylvanian patriots such as Bathory regarded the Treaty
as a sellout to the Habsburgs. On 14 March 1571 John Sigismund died without
an heir and without having submitted the Convention of Speyer to the Diet for
approval so that technically it did not have the force of law-at least in the eyes Of
many Transylvanians. In 1566 Sultan Suleiman had recognized the right of the
Transylvanian Diet to elect the Prince. The Diet proceeded with the election on
25 May 1571. There were two candidates: Bathory supported by the Sultan and
Bekes supported by the Habsburgs. B<Hhory was elected unanimouslylO.
In 1576 Rudolf II was elected Emperor after the death of his father, Maximilian II. There was also a new king in Poland that year. Henry Ill's return to
France resulted in his de facto abdication of Polish throne. The election of a new
king of Poland attracted half a dozen candidates, of whom the two most popular
were the Habsburg Archduke Maximilian and Stephan B<Hhory, Prince of Transylvania. The election was irregular and disputed, but B<Hhory emerged as King
of Poland-Lithuania. Four factors favored him: he enjoyed wide support among
the anti-Habsburg nobility led by Jan Zamoyski; he promised to marry Anna
Jagiellonka and thereby indirectly carryon an illustrious Polish dynasty; he had
the support of the Sultan, who mobilized an army against the Emperor; and he
marched into Krakow before the Habsburgs could react. He was both married
and anointed King on 1 May 1576. As Prince of Transylvania Bathory was in no
position to challenge effectively the Habsburg occupation of Szatmar or even
demand compensation. As King of Poland he was in a much stronger position,
but immediately after his elections there were more pressing problems than settling old accounts with the Habsburgs. Danzig (Gdansk) rose in a revolt that requir~d a major military operation to put down. The Khan of the Crimea and
100,000 Tartars were raiding Ruthenia. Most important was the Livonian War.
Since 1557 the Poles and the Swedes had been fighting parallel wars against the
Muscovy of Ivan the Terrible fcir control of the Baltic region. Until the Livonian
War was concluded, Bathory could not apply enough pressure to force the Imperial court to reopen the Szatmar question ll . That war ended early in 1582, thanks
in part to the efforts of a papal mediator, Antonio Possevino, who soon assumed
a similar role in the Szatmar dispute.

33-35; POSSEVINO, Transilvania 105-112.
Norman DAVIES, God's Playground: A History of Poland (New York 1982) I 421-423;
Louis SzADECZKY, L 'election d'Etienne Bathory au trone de Pologne, in Etienne Batory, 82-104.
Some Poles saw Habsburg intrigue behind both the Tatar attack and the Danzig revolt: see Edward KUNTZE, Les rapports de la Pologne avec Ie Saint-Siege a I'epoque d 'Etienne Bathory, in
10 LUKINICH

II

Etienne Balory, 165.
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ANTONIO POSSEVINO AS PAPAL MEDIATOR

The complex and protracted negotiations that resulted in the Peace of Jam
Zapolski between Muscovy and Poland-Lithuania (the Swedes did not participate) owed much to the papal mediator, Antonio Possevino, S.J., although the
peace mainly resulted from mutual exhaustion 12• For years the forces of Ivan IV
the Terrible had been on the defensive. Ivan sought to cut his losses by taking
advantage of Pope Gregory XIII's desire to forge an alliance of Christian rulers
against the Turks and to open Russia to Catholic influence. Ivan sent a representative to Rome in early 1581 to request papal good offices in attaining peace between Muscovy and Poland, dangling before the Pope the possibility of an antiTurkish alliance. Gregory assigned the Jesuit Antonio Possevino to the task of
mediator and conferred on him exceptional powers as papal nuncio and legate
for northern and eastern Europe. Possevino held preliminary discussions with
Bathory at Vilnius and with Ivan at Moscow before serving as honest broker in
the peace negotiations at Jam Zapolski in December and January. The Treaty
was concluded 15 January 1582 13 • Stephan BMhory had reason to be satisfied
with the considerable territorial gains made by Poland-Lithuania. The Poles had
had the best of the fighting, but the stout Russian resistance in the epic siege of
Pskov (1581) had dampened Polish ardor to continue the war to total victory.
Possevino's dealings with the Polish King ripened into an unusually close
relationship. Both were born in 1533; both had studied at the University of .
Padua; both were steeped in humanist cultured and had encyclopedic intellectual
interests; both conversed easily in Latin. B<ithory's exceptional confidence in
Possevino is shown. by a letter he wrote to Gregory XIII:
«So then we have noted singular trustworthiness in Father Possevino ... I have often
thoroughly discussed these matters with him that I feel pertinent to the public good of the
Christian name, so I reiterate my request that Your Holiness have complete trust in him
about these matters»14.

12 Possevino was born in Mantua on 12 July 1533, entered the Society at Rome 29 September
1559, and died at Ferrara 26 February 1611.
.
13 The literature on the negotiations is extensive. See Stanislas Pou::IN, Une tentative d 'Union
au xvr siecle: La Mission religieuse du Pere A';toine Possevin S.J. en Moscovie (1581-1582)
(Rome 1957); Paul PIERLING, Un arbitragt; pont{fical au XVI' siecle entre Pologne et la Russie: la
mission diplomatique de Pere Possevino, 1581-1582 (Brussels 1890); 10. La Saint-Stege, la Polo, gne et Moscou, 1582-1587 (Paris 1885); Liisi .KARTIUNEN, Antonio Possevino: un diplomate
pontifical au XVI' siecle (Laussane 1908). For Possevino's own account of his mission, written for
Gregory XIII, see Antonio POSSEVINO, The Moscovia, edited and translated by Hugh F. GRAHAM,
(Pittsburgh 1977). A general study of peacemaking in the sixteenth century is Joycelyne G. RusSELL'S Peacemaking in the Renaissance (Philadelphia 1986); for the section on the papacy's role,
see pp. 21-47.
14 Letter of Biithory to Gregory XIII, 27 August 1584, printed in Edward KUNTZE and Czeslaw
NANKE, editors, Alberto Bolognetti nuntii apostolici in Polonia epistolae et acta, 1581-1585 in
Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana (Krakow 1923-1950) VII 419, henceforward referred to as
MPV.
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Possevino's esteem for the King is most evident in a memorial he wrote to
guide Martin Laterna, the King's Jesuit confessor 15 . ·It was to Possevino that
BMhory entrusted the main task of negotiating a settlement of the Szatmar dispute. The negotiations went on from 1582 to 1585. Several factors contributed to
making Possevino the main facilitator of these negotiations. Crucial was the
confidence that he enjoyed not only with Bathory but also with Gregory XIII
and the Cardinal Secretary, Tolemeo Gallio, the Cardinal of Como. During this
period the Polish and Imperial courts did not have regular ambassadors with
each other. This allowed Possevino as nuncio extraordinary, who was frequently
traveling between the two courts, to playa key role as mediator even though the
Imperialists felt that Possevino was partial to BMhory.16 In this they were probably right, but his partiality could have had little affect on the negotiations. Possevino's task was to facilitate negotiations, suggest alternatives, and ease rancor.
He was not a mediator in the sense of one who has the power to make a decision
after hearing both sides. He had certainly been sympathetic to the Polish King in
his fight against Ivan the Terrible, but he had succeeded in mediating a treaty
both sides could accept. Any anti-Habsburg inclinations he had in these negotiations were more than offset by the papacy's desire for an amicable settlement, its
need to please the Habsburgs, and the fact that, unlike Ivan's diplomats, the Imperialists were dealing from a position of strength throughout the negotiations:
they were in possession of Szatmar and its adjacent territories. BMhory could
only plead for their restoration or for compensation.
The negotiations studied here have been largely ignored by previous historians, perhaps because they did not lead to war and because BMhory died shortly
after their conclusion. The World of Rudolf II: A Study in Intellectual History,
1576-1612 by R. 1. W. Evans never refers to these negotiations 17. They fall outside the parameters of Stanislas Polcin 's study of Possevino's mission to
Moscow. More surprisingly, Liisi Karttunen's study of his diplomatic career
merely alludes to the negotiations in passing 18. So does Edouard Kuntze, while

15 M. Laterna born 1552 at Drohobycz; entered Society 10 May at Braniewo; died 30 September 1598 in the Baltic Sea. Laszlo SZILAS, Der Hofprediger Latema, Possevino und der polnische
Konigshof Eine Instruktion Possevinos aus dem Jahre 1583, AHSI 40 (1971) 391-422.
16 Mon. alii. Hung. II (1580-1586) 6*, 767-768 (= LuKAcs II).
17 (Oxford 1973). Rudolf had an inflated sense of his own grandeur and suffered had severe
mental problems that grew worse with time and complicated negotiations: see H.C. MIDELFORT,
Mad Princes of Renaissance Germany (Charlottesville, VA 1994) 125-134. On his stance toward
a leagl,le against the Turks, see Friedrich von BEZOLD, Kaiser Rudolf II und die heilige riga. Koni lich Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen XVII (1886) 341-384.
8 KARTTUNEN, 217 218. There is no modern full-length biography of Possevino. The only full
biography is that of Jean DORIGNY (Paris 1712); I have used the Italian translation by Nicholas
GHEZZI, which contains a second volume of documents not in the French ed ition: Vita del P. Antonio Possevino della Compagnia di Gesu (Venice 1759). Georg Fell included a ninety page biography of Possevino at the beginning of his edition/translation of Possevino's De Cultura ingeniorum (277-367) in Die Jesuiten Perpina, Bonifacius und Possevin: Ausgewiihlte piidagogische
Schriften, edited and translated by J. STIER, H. SCHEID, and G. FELL (Freiburg im Breisgau 1901).
Neither of these works deals with the Szatmar negotiations.
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Ladislaus Lukacs devotes a paragraph to the Szatmar negotiations 19 . Ludwig
von Pastor gives them only two sentences20 . The most detailed discussion, by
Roderich Gooss, runs only six pages 21 . All the same, the negotiations have left
an abundance of archival materiaf2. The greatest part of this documentation is
the correspondence of Possevino. Possevino also incorporated a summary of the
first two years of the negotiations into his Transilvania, which he wrote for Gregory xm 23 . Hundreds of documents relating to the negotiations have been
printed, but in a variety of different works24.

19 Kuntze, Les rapports, 158, 166; LuKAcs, 15*-16*. The Szatmar negotiations are not treated
either in Andrea PONTECORVO MARTONFFY'S dissertation, The Early Counter-Reformation in
Hungary, Jesuits, Papal Nuncios, and the Hungarian Lands, 1550-1606, University of Chicago,
1980, or in Tamas SZAB6 's thesis, Antonio Possevinos Bemilhungen um die Erneuerung des Katholizismus in Siebenbiirgen, Rome, Pontificia Universita Gregoriana, 1990.
20 The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages, trans. R.F. KERR (St. Louis
1930) XJ( 444.
.
21 Roderich Gooss, editor, Osterreichische Staatsvertriige: Fiirstentum Siebenbiirgen (15261690), (Vienna 1911) 204-210.
22 Archivum secretum vaticanum (ASV), Nunz. Germ. 9394 and 95; Nunz. Pol. 15C, 17A;
Nunz. Pol. Ad II. 2. Also very rich for the negotiations are Antonio Possevino's papers in ARSI
Opp. NN. 317 3291 and II, 330. Possevino had his secretary, Thomas Sailly, SJ ., compile annual
letters of his diplomatic activity which often contain details of his negotiations. That dated 28
May 1582 covers 1581 and is found in two copies in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 64-72 and 85-94. The
annual letters for 1582 and 1583 are in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 133-170 and are partially printed in
LuKAcs II, 519-540. The annual letter for 1584 is ARSI Germ. 165 168-172. Possevino wrote a
detailed account of his prolonged negotiations, 13 June to 10 September 1583, at the Diet of Imperial Hungary held at Cassovia; this can be found in ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 106-132 but I have
used the copy in ARSI Opp. NN. 317112-134; this whole folder contains copies of documents 8176, dealing with the SZfltmar negotiations. It has been largely overlooked, except by Lukacs. It
seems that not many records of the Emperor's role in the negotiations have survived: «Rudolf is
scantily represented» in the Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, and the only printed collection
of Rudolf's correspondence covers the years 1589 to 1592: EVANS, 43 .
23 Antonio POSSEVINO, Transilvania, edited by Endre VERESS, (Budapest 1913) 149-172. This
edition is of the Transilvania is used throughout this essay. There is a later edition printed in Giacomo BASCAPE'S La Relazione fra I'ltalia e la Transilvania (Rome 1931). POSSEVINO'S Transilvania provides the most comprehensive account of the first three years of the negotiations. Gregory XIII found the Transilvania so interesting that he read through it in a few days. It is worth
noting that when the Cardinal Secretary returned the manuscript of Possevino's Transilvania to
the Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva, it came with instructions to delete most of the account of
the Szatmar negotiations before publication. Ibid., XII XJ(I-XXII. In fact Acquaviva decided not
to permit publication of the Transilvania so that the manuscript did not see print until 1913. On
the criticisms of the Jesuit censors against the Transilvania , see LuKAcs II, 953-958. The Jesuit
censors also requested the revision or deletion of the material on the negotiations: ibid., 954 958.
In contrast, Ludwig von Pastor speaks thus of th'e Transilvania: «The far-reaching and generous
spirit in which the zealous Jesuit drew out his arguments was in complete accordance with the
character and ideas of the aged Pope». XJ( 642.
.
24 The most copious printed source for documents and correspondence on the Szatmar negotiations is the Monumenta Poloniae Vaticana, Tomus V-VII, covering 1581-1585. Less valuable is
J6zef SIEMIENSKl, editor, Archiwum lana Zamoyskiego, kanclerza i hetmana wielkiego koronnego (Warsaw 1913) III (1582-1584). The reports of the Venetian ambassadors to the Imperial
court are printed in M6r KARpATHY-KRAVJJ\NSZKY, Rudolf uralkodtistinak elsa tiz eve (15761586). A Velencei Kir. AI/ami Levelttir cstiszari udvarbOl val6 kovetjelentesei alapjtin [The First
Ten Years of the Reign of Rudolf (1576-1586) on the Basis of Reports by Ambassadors from the
Imperial Court Taken from the Royal State Archives of Venice] (Budapest 1933). More than half
of these reports deal with the Szatmar negotiations and suggest that the Venetian government fol-

POSSEVINO AS PAPAL MEDIATOR

11

The interest of the Holy See in promoting an understanding between
Rudolf and BMhory had multiple and somewhat contra'ctictory motives. One was
the purely religious goal of promoting peace, especially peace between Christian
monarchs. Again and again wars between Catholic kings, most notably the Habsburg-Valois Wars, had weakened Catholic efforts to stem the Protestant tide
during the sixteenth century. Protestant congregations were widespread in the
lands of both Rudolf II and Stephan BMhory, but they did not constitute a military threat. For BMhory and the Poles the main threat was Ivan the Terrible. For
Rudolf the Hungarian frontier with the Turks was always in jeopardy, and we
have already noted how Bathory was able to use his status as a client of the Sultan for his Transylvanian lands to put pressure on the Habsburgs.
Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry for control of the Danube basin and the Balkans
was to endure for three hundred years, but during the early years of Rudolf's
reign there was little active fighting. Rudolf was less personally interested in the
art of war than in the mannerist paintings of Bartholomew Spranger and
Giuseppe Arcimboldo. He was so fascinated by astrology that in the crucial year
1588 he refused to see the Spanish ambassador for weeks on end 25 . In 1576, the
first year of Rudolf's reign, Turkish expansion began to gravitate toward Iran
and the Caspian and away from Hungary and the Mediterranean and resulted in
twelve years war of between the Turks and the Iranians and a treaty (21 March
1590) which gave the Sultan control of most of the Caucasus region. After a
brief interlude while the Turks put down internal revolts full scale war broke out
between the Ottomans and Rudolf along the Hungarian border from 1593 to
160626 •
The policy of Gregory XIII in trying to unite Catholic monarchs against Islam is part of long-standing papal policy going back to the First Crusade. The
call to crusade and to jihad could still stir many hearts in the sixteenth century.
Gregory XIII, more than any pontiff of the century, had a personal interest in the
Levant and in the Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. Close to
his heart was the goal of renewing the alliance against the Turks forged by his
predecessor Pius V and crowned with victory at Lepanto. But Venice, ever fearful for her trade and her possessions on Crete and on the Ionian islands, had de-

lowed them with considerable interest. These reports have an added value because they tend to reflect the Imperial viewpoint and thereby compensate for the preponderance of Possevino's correspondence in the source material used here, which better represents Polish and papal concerns.
Monumenta Antiquae Hungariae, edited by L. LuKAcs and cited earlier, prints a number of documents which touch on the negotiations. A few documents on the negotiations are found in two
works by Paul PIERLING: Bathory et Possevino: Documents inl?dits sur les rapports du SaintSiege avec les Slaves (Paris 1887) and Le Saint-Siege, la Pologne et Moscou, 1582-1587 (Paris
1885). Of marginal value for this topic is Augustinus Theiner'sA nnales ecclesiastici quos post...
Baronium .. . (Rome 1856), but see III 342 351 352 448 for relevant documents.
25 Garrett MATTINGLY, The Armada (Boston 1950) 179.
26 Femand BRAUDEL, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,
translated by Sian Reynolds (New York 1973) II 1166-11741196-1204. Useful for background is
Win fried SCHULZE, Reich und Turkengefahr im spaten 16. lahrhundert: Studien zu den politischen und gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen einer auj3eren Bedrohung (Munich 1978).
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serted the Holy League of Pius V shortly after Lepanto. Philip II had shifted
Spanish priorities from fighting the Turks in the Mediterranean to putting down
the revolt in the Netherlands.
The popes of the late sixteenth century sought to build a new Christian alliance in eastern Europe. Ideally such an alliance would embrace Rudolf,
Stephan Bathory and the Venetians. The Venetians remained rightly skeptical of
such schemes, but a secure alliance between Rudolf and BMhory might still persuade the Venetians to reconside~7 . The ultimate goal of Possevino's 1581 mission to Moscow had been to win Ivan the Terrible for the Grand Alliance, but
once Ivan had ended his war with the Poles, he gradually lost interest in a crusade against the Turks despite papal efforts to encourage him 28 . That made an
understanding between Rudolf and Stephan BMhory even more crucial to papal
plans. Rudolf was the most unmartial of monarchs, but BMhory was a proven
soldier who cut a figure of heroic proportions in both Poland and Transylvania.
One hero king would be enough for a crusade 29 • As the focal point of BMhory's
many grievances against the Habsburgs, Szatmar became the hinge of papal projects for a Grand Alliance against the Turks3o.
1582: BATHORY DEMANDS HIS LANDS BACK
In January 1581 the long Livonian War ended'f~oland. In April and May
Antonio Possevino had two private conversations in R1grand Vilnius with the
King; the second lasted for four hours. On May 27 Possevino reported from

27 On 12 August 1582 Possevino gave a long, wide-ranging discouse presenting papal plans
for the alliance alia signoria di Venezia in collegio and urging the Venetians to join the alliance. It
is printed in Paul PIERLiNG, Bathory et Possevino, 168-192. I have not been able to use Ludwik
BORATYNSKI 'S Stefan Batory i plan Ligi przeciw Turkom 1576-1584 (Krakow 1903). Von Pastor
(XIX 329) notes, «The thought of the league [against the Turks I runs like a scarlet thread throughout the pontificate of Gregory XIII, and to a great extent determined his attitude toward the
Christian powers».
28 Possevino continued through 1582 to urge Ivan IV to join a crusade against the Turks, for
instance by writing a long memorandum to the Czar entitled, De Foedere cum Serenissimo magno

Duce inter Christianos Principes adverslls Turcam sarciendo: Ac quodammodo id maxima cum
laude, et merito, atqlle Regnorum suorum propagatione Magnus Dux conseqlli poterit. ASV
Nunz. Germ. 93298-302. As late as 29 September 1582 the Venetian ambassador at Rome, Leonardo Donado, was reporting specific plans for an anti-Turkish alliance between Ivan and Bathory. The Pope, Philip II, and Venice were to subvent the effort with 60,000 ducats for Bathory
and 20,000 ducats for Ivan. The immediate target would be the Tartars, who were allied with the
Turks and provided cavalry for the Turks' on-going war with Persia. Moreover the Tartars had recently ravaged both Polish and Muscovite territories. Donado saw Possevino as the main promotor of the alliance: see PIERLING, Bathory et Possevino, 227-231.
29 Norman Davies entitles his chapter on this period of Polish history «Bathory: The Transylvanian Victor (1576-1586»>, I, 421-432.
30 An overview of papal policy in eastern Europe with emphasis on Possevino's role is presented in the two articles by Domenico CACCAMO, Conversione deWIslam e conqllista della Moscovia neWattivita diplomatica et letteraria diAntonio Possevino in Venezia e Ungheria nel Rinascimento, Vittorio BRANCA editor, (Florence 1973) 167-191 , and La diplomazia della Controriforma e la crociata: dei piani del Possevino alia 'illnga guerra' di Clemente Vlll, Archivio storico italiano, 128 (1971) 255-281. Papal policy toward the Turks in the middle years of the sixteenth century (1551-1571) leading up to Lepanto has been exhaustively studied by Kenneth
SEllON, The Papacy and the Levant (1204-1571), IV, The Sixteenth Century from Julius to PillS
V (Philadelphia 1984).
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Warsaw to Gallio, the Cardinal Secretary, on these conversations31 . The letter
touched many points: thus the King thanked the Pope for help in ending the
Livonian War. But the main focus was his intention to demand that Rudolf II return his Szatmar possessions. «The King began to speak to me with great
earnestness that he wanted to communicate to me a matter of great importance ...
so I could represent his wishes to His Holiness, the Emperor and to Christian
princes». Should events result in war, this should not come as a surprise «to
Christian princes, especially to His Holiness». There must be appropriate preliminary negotiations 32. At this point Possevino broke in and said that he thought
the King had the Emperor in mind, judging from their previous conversation in
Riga. BMhory admitted this, recounting the offenses that Maximilian II had
committed against him. He also noted the scant respect paid his ambassadors by
Rudolf, so much that he regretted having sent them, even though he had sought
genuine friendship with the Emperor. He was resolved to send an even more
splendid embassy to demand back his property, but he did not want to do so
without recourse to His Holiness, the princes of the Empire and other Christian
p~inces. Possevino asked him to hold back until he had consulted with the Pope,
whom God would use to enlighten him on what he should do. «He would find
that things that appear impossible to human thinking turn out easy when men do
their shopping with God». Reaching peace with Muscovy had been far harder
and more profitable than would be reaching an understanding with the Emperor.
Possevino counselled the King to postpone sending an impressive embassy to
Rudolf and to wait and see what the Pope could do by using his paternal diligence with the Emperor. Better to prepare the ground quietly, for grand embassies touch off rumors, and if they fail, they could make the King «more obligated to resentment and to taking action». If he got bogged down in such an enterprise, somebody might attack him in Livonia, and he would not have the
power to check the Sultan, who could take advantage of a quarrel between
. Bathory and Rudolf to increase his domain, as had happened in the past. Possevino went on to encourage the King to tell him how the situation could be repaired either with money or with some other sort of recompense or any other unforeseen way so that God could quietly direct the mind of the Emperor33.

31 MPV V, 352-360. Possevino also describes these conversations in his Transilvania, 150; he
says «he sensed the odor of a war of great importance for Christendom» in Bathory's words. It is
appropriate to note here the languages used in the discussions and correspondence. The papal diplomats used Italian among themselves, except for formal documents, which were in Latin. Possevino used Latin in dealing with Jan Zamoyski, the Polish Grand Chancellor, and with King Stephan Bathory, whose native language was Hungarian. He usually used Latin with the Emperor' s
advisors, but Spanish when dealing with Rudolf II himself who had spent much of his youth in
Spain and preferred to speak that language (see EVANS, 48-50; MPV VI, 264). Most of Possevino 's correspondence with the Imperial court was in Latin, but he wrote at least one letter to Rudolf in Spanish : see ASV Nunz. Pol. 15C 180-181, undated.
32 MPV V, 353-355.
33 Ibid., 355-356; POSSEVINO, Transilvania , 150-153. Bathory had tried to bring up the Szatmar question with the Emperor earlier, in 1578 and 1579, but his bargaining position then, before
the successful conclusion of the Livonian War, was far less strong. POSSEVlNO'S Transilvania ,
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BMhory acknowledged that the price of the land, which would constitute a
medium-sized duchy in Italy, would be easy to calculate but that he was completely opposed to selling his patrimonial inheritance for money because that involved dishonor, but to Possevino BMhory seemed less opposed to an exchange
of territory. The real reason he wanted back his own lands was the way Maximilian had seized and held them, «per notam infidelitatis» in the J(jng 's own words.
This weighed on him, and when his subjects urged him to recover the lands, they
pointed out that if he did not do so now that he was a king, he could never do so.
He was being forced to attempt their recovery. The J(jng closed the conversation
by agreeing to confer first with the Pope and by giving Possevino the task, «also
leaving me free to deal privately with the Emperor, and so he wrote in my papers
of credence» to the Pope34.
On May 14 BMhory had a third discussion with Possevino about relations
with the Emperor. He raised a new issue: the Emperor had notified two Polish
cities, Danzig and Elbl~g (Elbing), about the forthcoming Imperial Diet, addressing them as if they were his subjects. BMhory was indignant-what if he did
the same as regards Prague or Vienna! Possevino tried to calm him, pointing to
the pacific nature of Rudolf, and how Christendom would suffer if the two
monarchs were to give an opening to the Turks. The J(jng then told Possevino
that the reason why he had discussed the whole problem with him was because
rumors were floating throughout Germany that he wanted to invade Hungary-rumors started by the Imperial court. He asked Possevino to tell the Pope
not only about their discussions but that «he did not want to be the first to stir up
tumults among Christians»35.
Was the Szatmar dispute really likely to lead to war? The conversations
with Possevino clearly suggested that BMhory did not rule out military action
against the Emperor', and BMhory claimed that he could raise 30,000 cavalry and
10,000 infantry in Transylvania to back his complaints against the Empero~6.
But there is strong evidence that BMhory was more likely to threaten war than
actually start one. He later told Possevino that he never intended to go to war
over the Szatmar question37 . In the years treated here BMhory was no longer
technically the ruler of Transylvania, having surrendered the title of Prince of

149-158, and Opp. NN. 31711-13, review these early negotiations, which dealt not only with the
Szatmar question but eleven other sources of friction between the two monarchs. On the linkage
between the end of the Livonian War and the reopening of the Szatmar question, see ibid., 158
159.
.
34 Ibid., 153; MPV V, 356.
35 Ibid., 357.
36 KUNTZE, Les rapports, 164.
37 MPV VII, 437, Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, 29 April 1584. On 20 January 1583 Alberto
Bolognetti, the regular nuncio to the Polish court, wrote to Cardinal Guastavillani, the nephew of
Gregory XIII, an enormous and bitter letter (MPV VI, 32-57) denouncing Possevino for his role
in the Szatmar negotiations and for much else. Bolognetti was an able diplomat and officially
maintained cordial relations with Possevino but harbored an intense hatred for him which he revealed only in confidential letters to his brother and to his friend Guastavillani. Bolognetti accused Possevino of greatly exaggerating the danger of war between the two monarchs in his accounts to Gregory XIII and of working for the recall of the special Polish ambassador Hiero-
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Transylvania to his brother Christopher after his own election to the Polish
throne. When Christopher died in 1581, the title went 'to Christopher's son Sigismund. But BMhory effectively ruled Transylvania in his young nephew's
name 38 . The weakness of the Polish Kingship also made war less likely since the
powerful Polish nobility were unlikely to support a major war either to defend
their King's honor or to gain minor territories for the child-prince of Transylvania. Without widespread support among the nobility, war with the Emperor
would have been folly, and BMhory was no fool. Moreover, BMhory had potential enemies in Moscow and Constantinople who took priority over his personal
grievances with the Habsburg. The threat of war raised by Bathory seems largely
a bargaining chip, but many wars have been fought over royal honor and a
shorter list of injuries than BMhory 's.
After discussing the conversations with Jan Zamoyski, the Polish Grand
Chancellor, and with Alberto Bolognetti, the regular nuncio to the Polish court,
Possevino decided to go to Prague to discuss issues with the Emperor, probably
after preliminary talks with the Imperial Counselors39 •
By April 10 Alberto Badoer, the Venetian ambassador at Vienna, was reporting the forthcoming arrival of a Polish envoy who would ask for the return
Szatmar, Tochay, and Nemethy. The new Venetian Ambassador, Girolamo Lippomano, stopped at Trent on his way to the Imperial court and there conferred
with Cardinal Ludovico Madruzzo, who was about to depart as legate to the
forthcoming Diet at Augsburg. He reported the same news as Badoer, but added
that the Emperor felt that his father had rightfully taken these lands in war and
that subsequently heavy investments had been devoted to fortifying them. These
were arguments that would surface again and again40 .

nymus RozdraZewski so that he could monopolize the negotiations himself (Ibid., 39). According
to Bolognetti, Possevino was also trying to squeeze both the regular nuncios, himself and Bonomi
at the Imperial court, out of the Szatmar negotiations. Thoughts of war were far from Bathory's
mind, and Possevino's meddling was dangerous. Ibid., 34-39. Specifically, Bolognetti felt that the
account of Possevino's conversations with the King which Possevino sent to Cardinal Gallio on
27 May 1582 had exaggerated the danger of war: « .. .il Re, che pochi giomi dapoi si mettesse in
camino per Cracovia, mi parlo in questa materia molto allotigo, non mi parve di comprendere
dalle sue parole tanto pericolo di rottura contro l'Imperatore, quando haveva impresso il Padre
nell ' animo di N.S. [Gallio) ... » Ibid., 36. For similar letters revealing Bolognetti's hatred for Possevino, see MPV VI, 140-151 396-399; VII, 749-769.
38 Jacob Wujek [Born 1540 at W~growiec , Poland; entered Society 25 July 1567 at Rome; died
27 July 1597 at Krakow), the Jesuit rector at Cluj, reported to the Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva, on 18 August 1581, shortly after Christopher's death: «Transylvania fere ex praescripto Regis Poloniae gubematur nunc et deinceps etiam gubemabitur. Tutor ipse est pueri Principis». LuKAcs II, 161.
39 Ibid., 357. For Bolognetti, see Dizionario biografico degli Italiani (Rome 1969) XI, 313316. Pope Gregory XIII named Bolognetti cardinal on 11 December 1583 during his involvement
in the negotiations.
.
'
40 KARpATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 159. Badoer's dispatch is dated April 10, Lippomano's is April
22.
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On June 18 Possevino sent two reports back to Poland, a short one to Jan
Zamoyski 41 and a longer one to the King42. He reported on his discussions with
the Emperor's counselors 43 . Rudolf himself had already departed for the forthcoming Diet at Augsburg, so Possevino had taken the opportunity to discuss the
King 's demands with the Emperor's advisors at Prague, who claimed that Maximilian had rightfully captured the territories in war and therefore had done no injury to the BMhory family. BMhory 's unjust imprisonment was Maximilian's
doing, but he was dead, and Rudolf had never done BMhory any harm. There
was no basis for Polish suspicions that Rudolf had been intriguing with Ivan the
Terrible44 . His counselors claimed that as far as possible Rudolf had been striving to renew a treaty of friendship with Poland. If things were handled properly,
he would not fail to do everything desired of him so that the public need of the
two realms would be put before mere private interests. If necessary, private
questions too could be dealt with at the proper time as long as they did not interfere with the greater good. They also made excuses for the Emperor's letter to
Danzig and Elblag 45 .
Just before departing from Prague on June 19 Possevino wrote BMhory and
asked how he should respond if the same arguments were brought up at Augsburg by the Emperor. He reached Augsburg on June 25. The next day he conferred with Gian Francesco Bonomi, the nuncio to Rudolf, and with Cardinal
Ludovico Madruzzo, the special legate to the Diet46 . Reporting to Cardinal Gallio on July 20, Possevino described a preliminary conference with three of
Rudolf's closest advisors, Johannes Trautson, Adam Dietrichstein, and Wolfgang Rumf, before having «a very long and congenial audience» with Rudolf
himself in which Possevino recounted his dealings with Muscovy and discussed
the Szatmar question. ,The Emperor promised to deal with the question, calling it
«a most important matter for the good of Christendom»47. Rudolf also welcomed
the role of the Pope in seeking a resolution48.

MPV V, 384-385.
Ibid., 382-384.
43 He does not name them, but they were probably Wolfgang Rumf, the Imperial Counselor,
and Vratislav Pernstein, the Chancellor of Bohemia: ibid., 357, 384.
44 It is worth noting a report of Lippomano to the Doge (1 September 1582) that the Imperial
counselors had little praise for Possevino's role in mediating the peace between Muscovy and Poland. KARpATHy-KRAvJANszKY, 503.
45 MPV V, 383, 384.
•
46 MPV V, 392, n. 2. The considerable success of Madruzzo's mission is discussed by von PASTOR XX, 269-283. For Bonomi (also Bonhomini), see Dizionario biografico degli Italiani
(Rome 1970) XII, 309-314.
47 MPV V, 398.
48 Ibid., Rudolf (regarding the Pope) « •• • non solo sa gli uffici paterni fatti in questo negotio,
rna ne porta grata memoria, non senza speranza che S. Bne sia per promuoverlo a fine ... » Ibid.,
Later (21 September 1582) Possevino wrote to the Polish Ambassador in Rome, Peter Dunin
Wolski, « ... mihi Caes. Mtas mandasset suo que signo Caesareo Consilii Caesarei responsum muniisset et litteras quoque manu propria scriptas ad eius S[anctita]tem dedisset, ad eius Stem quidem veni, ut totam rem afferem». Possevino went on to say how he had written Bathory about
how hopeful he was after his interview with Rudolf: «ut possit Regia Mtas intelligere me maio41

42
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The Emperor responded to Bcithoryin a decree issued at Augsburg on July
13 in which he asserted his desire to renew the treaty of friendship with Poland
and invited Bathory to send a delegation to work out details. He rejected, however, Bcithory's claims to the Szatmar territories (<<the King could have no
proper cause for requesting those same territories»), but if the Pope could make
some proposals so that the affair could be settled, the Pope and all others would
realize how eager the Emperor was to secure peace. If Bathory were to pledge to
put the on-going negotiations for the friendship treaty ahead of this private matter, then Rudolf promised to do his part49 .
On July 13 the Emperor gave Possevino a rescript developing the familiar
arguments for rejecting Bathory's claims. When Maximilian II had conquered
the territories, he was making war against a prince who was allied with the Turkish enemies of the faith. Since then Szatmar had been radically transformed and
fortified at very great expense. Moreover Prince Sigismund had explicitly surrendered the territories to Maximilian at Speyer in 15705°. The Emperor, in
short, was rejecting Bcithory's claims to Szatmar while leaving open the possibility of concessions and linking the affair to the treaty of peace and friendship
that both desired.
On July 7, even before Posse vi no met the Emperor, Bathory had written to
Peter Dunin Wolski, his ambasssador in Rome, giving him background on the
controversy and instructing him to line up support among the cardinals and to
assure the Pope that he did not so much want the Pope to intercede for him with
the Emperor as to recognize the merits of his cause5l . On July 28 Lippomano reported from Augsburg news that at Warsaw Bcithory was speaking rather openly
about his desire for the fortresses or at least for compensation, otherwise there
might be war (<<si fara poi egli ragione con l'arme»). There was talk of summoning a Polish Diet in September, which would discuss not only the Szatmar question but also Polish claims in Silesia and Moravia. Lippomano asked his masters
to keep this information secret. But he held out the hope that if Bcithory was inclined to accept a reasonable solution, the Pope would be doing a service by
proposing a compromise, for Rudolf was making public how much he wanted
peace52 .
In response to Rudolf's invitation that he send a more formal embassy,
Bathory decided in August not to wait for a response from Rome, whither Pos-

rem aliquam spem de hoc negotio concepisse, quam revera antea conceperam ... » MPV V"
504.
49 MPV V, 406-407. This document is not to be confused with the one mentioned in the next
note, also issued by Rudolf II on 13 July 1582 and dealing with the Szatmar question.
50 Siemienski prints most of the rescript, 424 425. For the complete document, see ASV Nunz.
Pol. 17A 60-61. Lippomano reported the same details to the Venetian government on July 20 and
again in still more detail on July 28: KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 160 161. Lippomano's source for
this information was probably Possevino, who was providing him with a steady stream of information about the negotiations: ibid., 160 168 180; MPV V, 547 590; VI, 267n 275n.
51 MPV V, 399 .400.
52 MPV V, 162. «Havendo Sua M-ta voluto, che tullo questo sia risposto gratiossamente al
predello Don Antonio Possevino, rendendosi certa, che essendo referita questa sua sinciera volonta al Summo Pont-ce, S. S-ta non sia per mancare con ogni studio, industria et destreiza di re-
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sevino had gone after finishing his negotiations at Augsburg. He appointed a
special ambassador to the Imperial Diet. His choice was Bishop Hieronymus
RozdraZewski, who did not reach Augsburg until September 18, after the Diet
had closed and many of the princes had returned home 53 . Both Bonomi and Lippomano reported that he quickly made a bad impression on the Emperor and his
advisors. According to the nuncio Bonomi, one reason for the hostility toward
RozdraZewski was that his role seemed to conflict with the impression given by
BMhory to Possevino that BMhory wanted the Pope to serve as a mediatof4.
RozdraZewski's harshness seemed a counterpoise to the more supple, less confrontational style of Possevino. BMhory may have intended the contrasting
styles of the two negotiators. What is today called the good coplbad cop technique has a long history. Possevino 's proposals may have seemed more acceptable to the Imperialists precisely because they contrasted with the style and
statements of Rozdrazewski.
On September 22 Gregory XIII wrote Stephan BMhory, telling how Possevin a had described for him the differences between the two monarchs. He was
«incredibly troubled» and desirous that his sons be united in supreme charity.
The best solution was for the papacy to take the matter in hand. He exhorted the
King to allow friendly negotiations and put aside other ways of handling the
conflict and promised to send Possevino or a substitute to carryon negotiations 55 .
Also on September 22 Cardinal Gallio sent a copy of the Pope's letter to
Alberto Bolognetti, the Polish nuncio, and explained to him the course of the negotiations. Gallio stressed the Pope's concern that the negotiations go forward
without igniting a new fire in Christendom. The nuncio was to urge that Biithory
put aside any thought of settling the controversy by arms and be content to turn
negotiations over to the Holy See acting through Possevino or some other papal
representative.56 Two days later Possevino wrote to BMhory and expressed opti-'
mism about the negotiations as a result of his audience with Rudolf at Augsburg.
He gently reproved the King for seeming too pessimistic, especially now that the

durre il negotio a que I fine , che sia piu giovevole all Rep-ca Christiana. Nel resto S.M. offerisce
sempre al detto Possevino la sua gratia et favor Cesareo». Ibid.
53 MPV V, 409502503. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 163. The documents frequently refer to
Rozdrazewski by his diocese, Cuiaviensis (Vladislaviensis).
54 MPV V, 502 503. Lippomano reported of Rozdrazewski, «Onde Cesare vede mal volontieri
venir questo huomo, non tanto per Ie trattatione che porta, che si potrebbe pure accomodare con
persone ragionevoli et di buona mente, quanto per la natura sua moHo rigid a et per l'animo male
affetto verso di lui, et suoi predecessori». KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 163. POSSEVINO, Transilvania, 159, says of Rozdrazewski' s efforts, <d principi dell'imperio non recevevano per bene quella
le ~atione, come annunciatrice piutosto di guerra, che di pace»
5 MPV V, 502: «voler rirnetter tal controversia all arbitrio di N. Sre». In fact Possevino and
Rozdrazewski were old friends, who had known each other not only in Poland and Lithuania, but
also during Possevino's decade in France, 1562-1572: ASV Nunz. Pol. 17A 142v.
56 MPV V, 505 506. On September 8 Lippomano reported the arrival of a letter from the Pope
to the Emperor promising «d'interporsi moHo volontieri, et esser per fare ogni ufficio, accioche
restino accomodate Ie differenze della Maesta Sua col Polacco; il che esseguira subito che habbia
inteso ogni particolare dal Padre Possevino». KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 164.
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Pope's paternal care for all parties had come into play. Possevino insisted on
Rudolf's basic good will toward B<Hhory but expressed fears that Rozdrazewski's mission, undertaken before B<Hhory had been informed of the Emperor' s attitude, might hurt chances for an equitable settlement57 . The negotiations were
now on a different and more difficult basis than in the beginning because the
Emperor could be playing Possevino off against Rozdrazewski (<<gleefully taking advantage of the two working at odds with each other»). Possevino went on
to suggest a reason for ending Rozdrazewski's mission-it resulted from the recent meeting of the Polish Senate, but the Szatmar question pertained to Transylvania, not to Poland58 . His plea was largely successful, for the King wrote Rozdrazewski on December 6 that since the the Pope had taken up the matter, Rozdrazewski's only remaining task regarding the Szatmar negotiations would be to
urge the Emperor to a quick response59 .
On October 1 the Pope had written Bathory with high praise for Possevino
and told the King that «you may have the same trust in him as you have in us
personally»6o. The mood in Vienna, however, was anything but optimistic. The
various ambassadors there watched the unfolding negotiations with apprehension. The ambassador from Ferrara, Valentino Florio, reported back to Alfonso
II on October 30 that a rupture was likely since B<Hhory's demand for the
fortresses meant that the Emperor would have to give up extensive lands and put
in danger not only his Hungarian mines but the whole country61. Meanwhile
Lippomano reported to Venice information that he had picked up from an Italian
nobleman returning from Poland, who had told him that the nobility at the Polish
court were calling for war against the Emperor, and that Adam Dietrichstein, an
advisor to Rudolf, had described to him how B<Hhory had gathered a fund of
. 600,000 ducats plus jewels to recover the Szatmar land~ «sooner than people
think»62. Rozdrazewski meanwhile was chafing over the chronic procrastination
for which Rudolf was notorious 63 . He was tired, wanted to break off negotiations
and go home, convinced that the Emperor was unlikely to restore Szatmar or to
give equivalent compensation64 .
Possevino reached Vienna on November 15 and had brief meetings with
Rudolf and his advisors and with Rozdrazewski before hastening on to Poland.

57 MPV V, 507 509. Possevino' s initiative in getting the papacy to serve as mediator is made
clear in a letter (15 September 1582) of Gallio to Cardinal Madruzzo: ibid., 508. On the same day
as Gallio' s letter to Bolognetti, rumors were floating in Vienna that Rozdrazewski 's demands for
the return of Szatmar were being backed up by the Turks: KARpATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 165.
58 MPV V, 509 510.
59 MPV V, 591.
60 Ibid., 511. The Pope also stated, «Nihil autem opus esse intelligimus, eius fidem commendari, cui us sinceritatem, prudentiam, doctrinam, Dei Gloriae tuaeque dignitatis et laudis studium
inexhaustum cognitum tibi esse certo scimus» . Ibid.
61 MPV V, 545 .
62 Ibid., 546. Reports dated 2 and 9 November 1582.
63 EVANS, 64. Rudolf's tendancy to procrastinate contrastes with the decisive style of Bathory,
«a cui ogni dilatione era lunga». POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 159.
64 MPV V, 545 . Also KARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 167 168.

20

JOHN PATRICK DONNELLY, S.l.

The Emperor indicated a willingness to give Bathory some recompense in Hungary consistent with his own dignity and consonant with his desire for BMhory's
friendship65 . The next day Lippomano reported to Venice that he had dined with
Possevino at the Jesuit college and that a peaceful solution was likely because
Rudolf would offer Bathory territorial ' compensation66 . On November 22 the
Emperor issued a decree which promised to make compensation. Rozdrazewski
quickly insisted that the compensation be of equal value with the Szatmar lands
and that the negotiations for a renewal of the friendship treaty between Poland
and the Emperor be linked with the determination of compensation. The Emperor agreed to this, but noted the need for more information. The documents on
these points were forwarded to Possevino in Poland 67 .
In Warsaw things looked less bright. On or about November 18 the King
sent almost identical memoranda to the nuncio Alberto Bolognetti in Warsaw
and to Rozdrazewski in Vienna in response to Possevino's letter from Rome
which had indicated Rudolf's willingness to provide compensation for the occupation of the Szatmar territories. The King curtly rejected Rudolf's claim that
the fortresses were legitimate military conquests-rather they were taken over by
the Habsburgs as a direct result of Melchior Balassa's treason at a time when
there was not even a threat of war. BMhory accordingly refused to accept either
the loss of the land itself or of its income. He claimed that the cost of fortifying
Szatmar had been modest and that its return to his possession would not denude
Habsburg Hungary of its defenses. He likewise rejected arguments based on the
Convention of Speyer but did accept papal mediation looking toward a peaceful
solution68 .
Perhaps more alarming was a long discussion the King had with the nuncio
Alberto Bolognetti at this time 69 • The King indicated his acceptance of papal
mediation. When the subject of the decree on Szatmar that Rudolf had given
Possevino came up, Bolognetti tried to stress the Emperor's good will, but
Bathory went into a detailed recital of the whole history of the affair from his
perspective, stressing that the lands had not been taken from the King of Transylvania but «from himself and from his family» even though he had committed
no crime against the House of Austria. He therefore had been despoiled of his
personal possessions even though he had remained neutral in the quarrel between Emperor Ferdinand and John Zapolya. BMhory stressed that the lands had
belonged to his family for three generations. He also advanced a specific claim
beyond Szatmar and Nemethy to the disIpantled fortress of Zynyr Var (Szinyervaralja [Seini], which lies between Szatmar and Nagybanya [Baia-Mare]). The

65 MPV V, 544545 : two reports of Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, both dated 16 November
1582. Also KARpATHY-KRA VJ.A.NSZKY, 168 and POSSEVINO, Trallsi/vallia , 160. The Emperor provided Possevino with a carriage to speed his journey to Warsaw: ibid.
66 Ibid., 168; MPV V, 546.
67 MPV VI 14
68 MPV V,' 547 548; SIEMIENSKI, III, 425 426.
69 The editors of MPV suggest that Bolognetti's report to Cardinal Gallio about his discussion
with Bathory was written between November 18 and 25, 1582. MPV V, 550-552.
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fact that the Habsburgs had taken over this fortress on ·criminal charges and then
given it to others especially angered the King. The King went on to rebut other
arguments put forth by Rudolf and his advisors. The King stressed that he had
the Szatmar negotiations very much at heart because his surviving nephews
would reproach him if he did not obtain just restitution 7o .
On November 30 Lippomano, the Venetian ambassador at Vienna, reported
that Rozdraiewski had requested an audience with the Emperor, at which he
claimed that his King was being treated disrespectfully because two months had
passed with no response to his proposals. He stated that if he did not get a response within a day, he would interpret the Imperial irresolution as a denial. The
Emperor replied gently and urged him to wait a few more days, for an official response would be coming as soon as possible. The Emperor then held a meeting
of the Council of State at which a majority felt it best to wait for Possevino 's return within some fifty days. Others thought it best to put off Rozdrazewski with
the hope of an accomodation and with talk about consulting all the Christian
princes. The delaying tactics had a definite purpose since the Emperor had
meanwhile sent an embassy to Constantinople to seek an eight year truce. A
truce with the Turks would obviously strengthen Rudolf's hand in dealing with
Biithory but would largely dash papal hopes of enlisting Rudolf in a crusade
against the Turks 71.
Possevino had a meeting with Bathory at the beginning of December in
which the two discussed the Emperor's decree of 13 July 1582 regarding the
Szatmar dispute. The King showed evident displeasure with it but then returned
to a more even tone and when the conversation turned to the establishment of an
alliance against the Turks the King burst out in elation, «0 opus bonum, 0 opus
bonum! Utinam ante a in rem perductum fuisset>;72. The King then encouraged
Possevino to go to Transylvania and study the country for himself, noting what a
disaster it would be if this bulwark for the defense of Christendom were lost and
what a good sally port its retention would provide. Possevino took this as a cue
to tell Biithory how much God would give him light and heart for defending
Christendom and urged him not to rely on his Turkish allies 73 . In fact, at this
time Bathory was building up the defenses of Varadino (Nagyvarad, OradeaMare) in Transylvania to the distinct displeasure of the Turks74.
At the end of December, much to the relief of both Rozdrazewski and
Rudolf II, a special courrier from Possevino arrived in Vienna with letters for
both of them, which certified that Biithory would be satisfied with compensa-

Ibid.
KARpATIIY-KRAVJANSZKY, 169; POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 159. As will be seen, the truce
between the Emperor and the Sultan was renewed early in 1583, ibid., 160.
72 MPV V, 589: Possevino to Gallio, 7 December 1582.
73 Ibid., It may have been at this meeting with Bathory that Possevino gave the King copies of
his correspondence with Rudolf. Bathory sent copies to Zamoyski, who in turn wote Possevino
about how pleased the King was with them: «Literas ... quas vehementer se probare Reg. M-tas
mihi significavit». Zamoyski to Possevino, 6 December 1582: SIEMIENSKI, III, 126.
74 Ibid., KARpATHy-KRAVJANsZKY, 170.
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tion. Possevino 's letter contained some specifications about suitable compensation 75• BMhory preferred that Szatmar itself and its adjacent territories be returned, and if the Emperor so wished, he could dismantle the new fortifications
before their return. Bathory indicated his view that there was no equivalent territory which could be given him which would not result in even greater danger to
Hungary, and he insisted that the compensation should not be in Dalmatia or
some other area distant from his homeland. He urged the Emperor to make a decision «as quickly as possibe» about the the compensation to be offered 76 •
The year 1582, then, ended on a positive note. Just compensation and an
amicable settlement, not war, seemed ahead, but the negotiations soon devolved
into protracted haggling and two years of delays.
1583:

THE MONARCHS HAGGLE AND TIIE TURKS THREATEN

The negotiations over the Szatmar dispute moved to a lower key in 1583.
The Emperor was willing to offer compensation. But what would he offer?
Would the offer be acceptable to King Stephan BMhory? Would Rudolf attach
conditions to the territory being offered? These questions dominated the slow
progress of the negotiations throughout 1583.
At the beginning of the new year Possevino went over the whole question
with Stephan Bathory in Krakow and sent Rudolf an account of the discussion
on January 7, 1583. The King had rejected out of hand the rumors that had been
circulating at the Imperial court that he was plotting with the Turks against the
Habsburg possessions in Hungary. He felt that the best solution for the dispute
would be for the Emperor to dismantle the fortifications at Szatmar and turn the
city over to him on the understanding that it would not be refortified. The King
himself took up a pep and redrew the border between Transylvania and Habsburg Hungary. Possevino enclosed this map in his letter to the Emperor77.
On January 15 Gallio, the Cardinal Secretary, wrote Possevino to tell him
how much he and Gregory XIII were pleased with his report of December 7
about his discussions with BMhory and with the King's enthusiasm for a crusade. Gallio reported that the Pope took satisfaction in BMhory 's prompt acceptance of papal mediation but expressed hope that it might not be needed in view
of new information received in Rome from Bonomi, the nuncio in Vienna.
Twice Gallio noted his hope that a speedy accommodation was at hand so that
the Pope could delight «in seeing as soon as possible these great and good

75 On 28 December Lippomano sent to Venice a report about the letter and a shortened Italian
translation, saying that he had obtained the letter «sicurissima strada» and insisted that its contents be kept «molto secreta». Both are printed by J(ARpATHY-KRA VJANszKY, 171 172. Perhaps he
was puffing up his ability to get secret information. In fact Possevino sent him a copy of his letter
at the request of Bonomi, the nuncio in Vienna: see Possevino' s letter to Bonomi, 7 December
1582, MPV V, 591.
76 Most of Possevino's Latin letter to Rudolf II, dated 6 December 1582, is printed in MPV V,
590.
77 MPV VI, 14n. On the same day, 3 January, Possevino sent a bundle of documents dealing
with the Szatmiir dispute to Cardinal Gallio. Ibid.
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princes in peace and union»78. In fact, Bonomi's letter (7 December 1582) was
more guarded than Gallio suggested. Bonomi felt that the negotiations were going excellently since the King was willing to accept equal compensation, but he
pointed out Rozdrazewski's insistence that the compensation must be specified
and be «in bonis fructiferis et aequivalentibus». Despite remaining difficulties,
the parties seemed close to an agreement which would conclude the whole problem. But Bonomi was still more guarded in a letter of December 21 to Gallio after he had received news from Bolognetti about the mood at the Polish court, and
he noted that Possevino' s proposals seemed to be too partial to Bathory to please
the Emperor79. Even less optimistic but more prescient were the reports sent
home by the ambassadors of Ferrara and of Venice at Vienna; both rightly felt
that the negotiations were likely to be prolonged8o . Bonomi also reported to Gallio that the Imperial counsellors might want to conclude the negotiations with
RozdraZewski, the special Polish ambassador, rather than wait for the return of
Possevino, whose visits to Vienna were often little more than hasty stops.
Bonomi stressed how the counsellors habitually took their time to reflect on decisions, and noted how he had suggested to the Emperor that he might want to
offer BMhory a choice of any of the territories and villages in the Szatmar prefecture which the King deemed fair compensation. The King might then send
commissioners to study the options and gage their worth 81 . Late in January the
Emperor did send BMhory a' letter promising that he would forward a list of several places as possible compensation; they would be in Hungary but near Transylvania, as the King wished, but the matter would have to be discussed at the
forthcoming meeting of the Hungarian Diet at Pozsony [Bratislava, Pressburg],
which the Emperor was planning to attend. Possevino reported on February 10
to Bonomi that the King wanted Rozdrazewski to stay at the Imperial court, despite his desire to return home, for the King was eager to be finished with the
whole affair and was optimistic about the Emperor's good will. He noted that he
had passed on to Bathory Bonomi's suggestions for the negotiations82 .
In early April the Emperor's agents in Constantinople after long negotiations concluded an eight year truce with the Sultan, although the truce did not
put an end to chronic border raiding by both sides. Ever since BMhory had come
to power in Transylvania in 1576, he had been able to use his own alliance with
the Turks to counter Habsburg pressure. Now Rudolf had carried out a minor
diplomatic revolution, which became even more evident in August when the
Sultan sent representatives to dissuade Bathory from any thought of military action against the Emperor. They also warned the Polish King not to attack the
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Ibid" 26n.
Ibid., 26.
To Ferrara, 18 December: MPV VI, 27n; to Venice, 18 January, KARPATHY-KRAvJANszKY,

173.
81 MPV VI, 27n" Bonomi to Gallio, 25 January 1583. Bonomi made the same points to Possevi no in a letter of 26 January: LuKAcs II, 367.
82 MPV VI, 113. Also KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 172-173, for reports of the Venetian ambassador touching these developments.
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Tartars, for the Sultan wanted to use them as allies and mercenaries in his on-going war against Persia83 . Moreover, when word reached Vienna in late February
that BcHhory was seriously ill, the court began to devise strategies to elect Archduke Ernest to the Polish throne, but these were quickly scotched when new reports came in that Bathory had recovered 84 .
When Possevino arrived at the Hungarian Diet in Pozsony, he tried a new
but feeble argument on Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor: it was
now even more imperative to solve the Szatmar dispute so as to refute the imputation that the Emperor had sought the help of the hated Turks against a fellow
Christian prince8s .
BcHhory remained confident of a settlement. On 28 February he told the
nuncio Bolognetti that it would be wrong to doubt the good faith of the Emperor86. Two weeks later Bishop Rozdrazewski, tired of Imperial procrastination, insisted on a personal meeting with Rudolf. He was given the Emperor's
pledge to provide compensation, but the Emperor, it seems, refrained from suggesting specific places, pleading the need to consult with the forthcoming Hungarian Diet. Rozdrazewski left the audience still dissatisfied and returned to
Poland87 .
On 30 March Bathory wrote in his own hand to Possevino, who had been
on an inspection tour in Transylvania and was about to journey to Pozsony
to meet with the Emperor at the Hungarian Diet. Bathory indicated that Rozdrazewski had returned to Krakow and had reported that Rudolf had 'named
several commissioners who would be going in mid May to Cassovia to discuss
the specifics of compensation with delegates to be named by the Polish King.
Possevino would be, there to serve as mediator. BcHhory feared more stalling
tactics but had agreed to the time and place suggested by Rudolf, even though
he felt that Rudolf should have first made an offer of specific territory. BcHhory
speculated that the Emperor's conmissaries (commissarii) would offer several
villages around the dilapidated fortress of Erd6d to the south of Szatmar. The
King reminded Possevino that he had earlier told him that such an offer was
not acceptable because it was not equivalent. «If his Imperial Majesty really
desires and esteems our friendship, what prevents him from returning our property to us?» BcHhory brushed off the argument that the fortifications and villages
around Szatmar had been improved and claimed he would repay the Emperor's

POSSEVINO, Transiivallia, 159-162; KARPATHy-KRAvJANsZKY, 179.
Ibid., 174 175: Lippornano's dispatches of 22 February and 1 March.
85 POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 16l.
86 [Bathory] «Disse anco di piu che quanta a questo negocio, Ie pareva d'essere in sicuro perch€: havendo I, Irnperatore gia confessato il debito et prornesso, non solarnente di sodisfarlo, rna di
norninar esso i luoghi che voleva dar in recornpensa di Zacrnar et Nernet, non Ii pareva d' haver a
dubitare della fede d' un prencipe che tenga luogo tale fra gl'altri prencipi di christanita ... » Bolognetti to Gallio, 1 March 1583: MPV VI, 169.
87 Ibid., 163n. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 176.
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costs and promised not to be outdone in generosity. If Rudolf should insist,
he should keep the villages and dismantle the fortress 88 .
After finishing his inspection of Transylvania89 , Possevino arrived in Vienna in early April, where he had discussions with Archduke Ernest before moving on to Pozsony, where he went over the whole Szatmar question first with Johann Trautson and then with Rudolf himself. On April 25 he sent Rudolf a letter
urging him to restore Szatmar itself, but on condition that the officer put in
charge of the fortress by BMhory must also swear an oath to Rudolf that the
fortress would never be used against the Emperor were the Turks to invade Hungary90. The next day Possevino wrote BMhory and reported on these negotiations; he noted that he had shown Rudolf the hand-written note of March 30
which Bathory had sent him. The Emperor was pleased since he had not yet been
informed that the King was going to send a commissary to Cassovia. He
promised that he would not offer just a few small villages but something equivalent to Szatmar's value at the time when Maximilian II had occupied it91. Also
on April 26 Possevino wrote a report of his meeting with the Emperor to Cardinal Gallio and added that from conversations with the Venetian Ambassador
Lippomano, he expected the Emperor's commissaries to employ more stalling
tactics92. Events were to vindicate this pessimism.
Lippomano 's own dispatch to the Doge put Possevino 's negotiations in a
larger context. On April 26 he reported on the Emperor's troubles with the Hungarians. At the Diet Rudolf had had to make concessions to Hungarian national
feeling, promising to appoint Hungarians as bishops, to replace German fortress
commanders with Hungarians, and to abide by ancient Hungarian law rather
than trying to rule autocratically. Lippomano followed this with a dispatch of
May 3 which announced the Imperial-Turkish truce and contained an account of
Possevino's meeting with the Emperor and his counsellors, an account which he
must have had from Possevino himself. Lippomano added something that Possevino had not confided to either BMhory or Gallio: that he had told the Emperor
that BMhory would be glad to renew the old Polish-Imperial treaty of friendship,
but since Bathory tended to be a man of action, unless he were given prompt sat-

88 MPV VI, 211. Bathory gave Possevino a copy of Book 7 of Giovanni Michele BRUTo's, Rerllm Hungaricarum Libri XX (1490-1552) to fill in his background in preparation for the Szatmar
negotiations. Since Bruto wrote the work at the King 's request, it was hardly impartial. Reading
the account of the Protestant Bruto seems to have encouraged Possevino to write his own Transilvania for Gregory XIII and to have furnished him with material: LuKAcs II, 558 652. Possevino
wrote most of the Transilvania during breaks in the negotiations at Cassovia, September to December, 1583: ibid., 558 628 652.
89 On Possevino' s forty-seven day inspection tour of Transylvania, see LuKAcs II, 525-540.
He visited Szatmar and described its condition to Bathory in a letter of 6 March 1583. He rated its
fortifications as stronger than those at Riga: ibid., 407-409. After his return to Poland Possevino
also had severas long conversations with the King about his tour: ibid., 463.
90 MPV VI, 264n.
91 Ibid., 264-266.
92 Ibid., 267. On April 28 Possevino reported to Bolognetti at the Polish court about a meeting
that same day with Rudolf; he had give the Emperor a memorial on reasons for solving the dispute: ibid., 275. For the memorial : ibid, 264n and ASV, Nllnz. Pol. 15C 171 ff.
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isfaction he might take advantage of his excellent knowledge of Hungarian dissatisfaction with the Habsburg. Were that to happen, the Turks might move in
and take over all of both Transylvania and Hungary. That possibility had to be a
factor in encouraging Rudolf to reach a settlement over Szatmar. Lippomano did
not need to point out that Bathory was himself Hungarian 93 .
Bcithory designated Martin Berzeviczy, his Chancellor for Transylvania, as
his commissary to meet with the Imperial commissaries 94 • The Imperial commissaries were led by Gregory Bornemissza (the Bishop of Nagyvarad
[VaradinoD and included Johann Rueber (the commanding general for Hapsburg forces in Hungary), Rudolfo Ferdinando Nogarola (the military commander at Szatmar), and the cameral officials Felix Herberstein, Christopher Teuffenbach and Francis Nagyvcithy95 . Berzeviczy was set to leave for Cassovia on
May 19 when Johann Trautson sent word that the Imperial commissaries would
be delayed. Bcithory was mildly upset, and Berzeviczy 's departure was postponed two weeks96 .
On June 14, shortly after their arrival, the Imperial commissaries offered as
compensation the small towns of Belek and Dobra, which they claimed were
more than equivalent to Szatmar and Nemethy because of the beauty of their
site, the fertility of their fields and their vineyards, forests and pastures. Berzeviczy scoffed at the offer as totally unequal and threatened to break off the negotiations rather than go on with such an indignity to his King. On June 17 the Imperial commissaries slightly raised their offer by adding the town of Erdewdzada
near the Zamos River; these three towns would be for Szatraar and Nemethy,
and the commissaries said they had written the Emperor about adding ten
smaller villages (pagi) inhabited by Walachians. Berzeviczy made it clear that
Bcithory would prefer areas inhabited by Hungarians rather than by Walachians97 .
The commissaries claimed that they would have to seek more information
and instructions from Rudolt8. The commissaries returned with a more generous offer: three more villages in addition to the previous offer, but Berzeviczy
rejected this as still not equivalent to Szatmar and to the pledges made earlier by

93 KARpATHy-KRAvJANSZKY, 177-181. It is obvious from Lippomano's dispatches that Possevino was providing him with confidential information, which he forwarded to Venice. Why?
Most likely because Lippomano was giving him information in tum about affairs and personalities at the Imperial court. Perhaps Possevino was also trying to foster good will toward the Holy
See and the Jesuits among the Venetian leadel;Ship.
94 Berzeviczy's activity as commissary is discussed by Endre VERESS, Berzeviczy Marton,
1538-1596 (Budapest 1911) 158-172.
95 Ibid., 158; SIEMIENSKJ, 214. Berzeviczy and Rueber were Protestants, much to Possevino
annoyance: POSSEVINO, Transilvania, 170. Rueber had proscribed Catholicism in Cassovia. Possevino tried to have him replaced as commanding general by the Catholic Nogarola: LuKAcs II,
588 594. In April 1584 Nogarola did take over the post, after Rueber 's death : ibid., 695.
96 Bolognetti to Gallio, 28 May 1583; MPV VI, 322. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 183.
97 ARSI, Opp. NN. 317113-116. Possevino's account of the negotiations, which ran from June
13 to October 20, 1583, includes both oral and written exchanges, see ibid. 112-134.
98 See Possevino's letters to Cardinal Gallio of 26 June 1583 (MPV VI, 370) and 16 July 1583
(Ibid., 420).
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the Emperor. In a letter of July 17 to Possevino Berzeviczy complained that during the five weeks he was stuck there (<<hic haereo») the only communication received from the Emperor was a statement that he had sent letters to his commissaries. Berzeviczy considered this shabby treatment insulting to King Stephan99 •
Possevino replied five days later and urged him not to leave Cassovia without
giving the Emperor an advanced warning, which should be done respectfully. He
might want to let the Imperial commissaries know that their delaying was contrary to the promise of a swift settlement that Rudolf had given orally to Possevino in April lOO.
Possevino showed Bathory his letter to Berzeviczy. The King wrote Possevino a note indicating his approval and said that he himself had ordered Berzeviczy home unless there was a response from Rudolf in fifteen days, but that in
leaving he should not make a protest but simply point to the delays and to the
Emperor's repeated promises of a swift and fair settlement lOl . In July the Emperor revised again his package of compensation for Szatmar. The most important item was the fortified town of Nagybanya (Baia-Mare, Rivulus Dominarum)
some forty miles southeast of Szatmar. Included was the town of Felsoe Banya
together with several villages: Laczfalva, Orocfalva, Also, Felso, and Siingefalva. The offer had several conditions: the friendship treaty between the two
monarchs must be signed and the places being handed over could not later be
fortified 102.
Biithory told Possevino that the recompense being offered was not «equivalent as regards income, much less than as regards jurisdiction, site, lands or
towns, and so forth» 103. On August 9 Possevino wrote two letters which describes
another recent conversation with Bathory and the King's frustration. The longer
letter, to Cardinal Gallio, noted the King's emotion because his family's claims
to the Szatmar lands were being questioned. His main concern was not the loss
of income from the lands, for it was only 11,000 thalers; rather his reason for
pursuing the case was «that my fairness may be manifest to all». The King then
launched into a long catalogue of his past mistreatment at the hands of Maximilian II, adding details, for instance that he had once sent Maximilian a warning
about what the Turks were doing. The Emperor betrayed t~is kindness by sending his letter to the Sultan to compromise Biithory's standing with the Turks.
The whole tenor and content of the conversation made it clear that Bathory's
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Ibid., 437n.
ASV Nunz. Germ. 94 155-156. For Rudolf's promise of a speedy settlement, MPV VI,

264.
101 Ibid., 437n. Bolognetti wrote Cardinal Gallio (23 iuly 1583) that Bathory doubted that the
Szatmar negotiations would lead to good results: MPV VI, 437.
102 Ibid., 504n. Early in September Count Nogarola, one of the Imperial commissaries, provided Possevino with a statement of the annual income of Nagybanya and the other towns being offered as compensation. Possevino transmitted this information to the King and his Grand Chancellor Zamoyski: LuKAcs II, 548-550.
103 Possevino in . Krakow to Bolognetti, 7 August 1583: MPV VI, 474.
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pride and honor were the real issue in the Szatmar negotiations 104. The second
letter was to Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor, and quoted the
King as saying, «God knows that I value fairness so much that I put it above
Szatmar and everything else»105.
The King's determination greatly displeased the Council of State at Vienna,
which was indisposed to increase its offer any further 106 . On August 7 Berzeviczy
wrote Possevino and vented his frustrations over the negotiations. As the Imperial commissaries could testify, he had employed supreme moderation and mustered all possible arguments, yet the negotiations made no progress. «They give
us nothing but words». <<1 candidly confess that I have completely despaired of
this business». Berzeviczy complained that the Imperial commissaries could do
nothing without checking with Vienna, and he saw the sinister hand of the Turks
behind the delays107. Berzeviczy threatened to leave Cassovia, and did so briefly,
but then Bathory ordered him back to resume discussions. To underline his determination, the King also ordered the reinforcement of one of his border
fortresses «as a sign of his little good will toward his Imperial Majesty». Rudolf
replied by having Johann Rueber, his military commander in Hungary, send additional troops to reinforce Szatmar108 .
In late August Stephan Bathory wrote two letters which showed his displeasure. The first was to Possevino and dated August 23; it was so strong that
Possevino wrote on the back of it: «Perhaps this will have to be burned». The
King scorned and derided the compensation being offered by the Emperor. Were
he to accept «such an honon>, as the King termed the compensation sarcastically,
«ordinary people would undoubtedly judge me to be mad»109.
Bathory 's second letter (August 28) was addressed directly to the Emperor
and was more restrained. The King suggested that it was best to bury the memory of what Maximifian II had done to him and «to show the world his desire for
the good of all Christians to put down the infidel, whom nobody could ever
trusb>. He claimed that he never had any desire to fortify Nagybanya. There was
no purpose in doing so since it was far from Habsburg territory. Had he planned
to build a fortress directed against the Emperor, he would have selected Hust,
which was his own possession and close to the Emperor's territory. He also denied the rumors that he had designs to seize Szatmar-had he wanted to seize territory, he could easily have taken unfortified places such as Nagybanya and others and then held on to them until he received recompense. Instead he had sought
to recover Szatmar through his ambassadors. He could easily have recruited

Ibid., 478-48l.
Ibid., 478n.
106 Lippomano' s dispatch of 17 August 1583: KARPATHY-KRA VJANSZKY, 184.
107 ARSI Opp NN. 317 40r; Opp. NN. 329 187.
108 Lippomano's dispatch of 6 September: KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 185.
109 MPV VI, 495. The Imperial commissaries at Cassovia were equally belligerent. They told
Berzeviczy that unless the King accepted their offer of increased compensation, it would be obvious to everybody that he desired war rather than peace, personal gain rather than the public
good: Berzeviczy to Possevino, 25 August 1583, ARSI Opp. NN. 317 53r.
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troops in Transylvania, which had remained at peace while Habsburg Hungary
was being ravaged by the Turks. Bathory then argued .that Szatmar was of little
military value for defending Habsburg Hungary since it did not lie across the
main line of a Turkish offensive. The money that the Habsburgs had spent in fortifying it-Bathory estimated the cost at 50,000 to 60,000 Florins-was wasted.
Worse, its German garrison tended to alienate the Emperor's Hungarian subjects. Were Rudolf to return Szatmar, Bathory promised to give 30,000 thalers
for its defortification and pledged that he would not allow its refortification.
Once Szatmar was returned, there would be no more reason for fortifying adjacent towns. He closed by calling the Emperor's attention to the disparity between Szatmar and the Nagybanya mines and Walachian villages which the Emperor was offering in compensation. He also promised to foster Catholicism in
the region, as he had done elsewhere in Transylvania llo .
The difference of tone and content in the two letters undoubtedly stems
partly from the fact that BMhory's second letter was addressed to a fellow
monarch, but it may owe something to a memorial that Possevino presented to
the King, most likely at this time. In it Possevino drew on the King's religious
conviction ~ to persuade him to agree to the Emperor's offer. «Listen to Christ
the Son of God saying, 'If somebody wants your coat, give him your cloak also'». Possevino pointed out that even if the towns and villages being offered did
not match the value of Szatmar and Nemethy, they were concrete offers,
whereas for years the Emperor had rejected all demands. Now he was admitting,
not just in words but in deeds, the justice of BMhory's case, and that was something worth more than many Szatmars. Even if Possevino's intervention may
have softened the King's tone, the King continued to reject the Emperor's
offer 11I •
In August the Sultan sent an envoy to BMhory with the threat of war unless
he put an end to troop movements on the border with Moldavia and returned to
Turkish rule four places recently occupied by Polish Cossacks1l2. The Sultan

KARPAUrv-KRAVJANSZKY, 186-187.
Propos ita abAntonio Possevillo Stephallo Regi Pololliae Cracoviae de mellse Augusti 1583 :
ARSI Opp. NN. 317 39-40. Since the memorial refers to the increased compensation (f. 39v), it
must be toward the end of the month. It comes right after the King' s letter of August 23 in Possevino's letters.
Jl2 Lippomano 's dispatch of 13 September: KARPAnrv-KRAVJANSZKY, 185. In October 1583
three thousand Turks launched a devastating raid into Transylvania, sacked many villages, seized
goods, and carried off prisoners. Troops from Hapsburg Hungary came to the aid of Bathory's
Transylvanians. The Turkish attack was a reprisal for raids on their territory by Polish Cossacks.
Bathory wrote the Sultan, suggesting that the Turks should attack the Cossacks, not the Transylvanians, but the Cossacks intercepted his letter and made it public, to his considerable embarrassment in Poland. Ibid., 189: Lippomano's dispatch of November 30, which contains a report by
the Captain at Toccai dated 28 October 1583. Also see POSSEVINO, Trallsilvania , 164-165. On
December 26 Possevino reported to Cardinal Gallio about more Turkish raids against Habsburg
Hungary and the poor condition of the fortifications there. This time 400 Transylvanian infantry
and 400 cavalry had come to the aid of the Hungarians. Clearly the forces of Bathory and the Emperor were cooperating against the Turks even without a formal alliance: MPV VI, 724. These
raids took place despite the Emperor's eight year truce with the Turks and despite the fact that the
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again warned Bathory against molesting the Tartars, whose help he wanted for
his war against the Persians, and against stirring up affairs in Hungary now that
the Emperor had concluded the eight year truce with the Turks113. The Turks also
increased the tribute that Transylvania had to pay them to 40,000 ducats per
year1l4.
ABORTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AT CASSOVIA

It is against this background that Possevino left Krakow on September 14
to play an active role as mediator at Cassovia, where he took up residence at an
inn four days later. Others in the papal diplomatic corps were not optimistic
about his prospects. Bolognetti warned Cardinal Gallio that the I?eeting was
«not the sort from which one can hope a very speedy conclusion, especially considering what I have written about how his Majesty discussed with me taking up
arms against the Turks»1l5. Gallio wrote Possevino before he left Poland to encourage him not to despair of success and passed on Gregory XIII's promise that
«His Holiness will not fail to make use of every effort and of his authority» to
terminate the controversy. Gallio promised to have Bonomi, the nuncio to the
Emperor, work for the same end1l6.
Possevino's stay in Cassovia lasted from late September 1583 until mid
January 1584, but the King's commissary broke off negotiations and left the city
on October 20. Possevino's papers contain a running account (June 14 to October 20) of the meetings and exchanges of the two parties that the nuncio was trying in vain to bring together l17 . Before leaving for Cassovia Possevino prepared a
bundle of instructions which he then checked out with Bathory. They included
two sets of instructions, one to be shown generally, the other for Berzeviczy's
eyes only. If asked why he was attending the meetings of the commissaries of
the two princes, he WfiS to reply that Bathory felt he could speed up negotiations
and foster the projected pact of friendship. Possevino understood the mind of
both princes, Bathory claimed. He was to try to have more authority given the
Imperial commissaries so as to expedite negotiations1l8. Possevino was given a
document to show Berzeviczy which was entitled «The Ultimate Resolution of
His Sacred Royal Majesty in the Szatmar and Nemethy Negotiations Entrusted
to the Reverend Master Antonio Possevino, Krakow, 19 September 1583». It authorized Berzeviczy to accept Nagybanya as the center piece of the compensation, and Bathory was willing to promise never to fortify it. If the other places
Bathory had requested could not be given, the Imperial commissaries would
have to promise other territories as substitutes. As to the friendship pact: the

Emperor was paying 130,000 Florins annually and his Hungarian subjects another 500,000 to the
Sultan as tribute: Possevino to Bathory, 29 December 1583; ibid.
113 POSSEVINO, Transilvania , 162.
114 Ibid., 165.
115 14 August 1583: MPV VI, 485.
116 20 August 1583; ibid., 488; also 3 September 1583; ibid., 517.
117 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 113-134.
118 Ibid., 61-63.
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King indicated that nothing would be more gratifying to him, but that he would
send envoys to settle the details of the pact when the Emperor designated the
place and sent his own commissaries, who were to be invested with full authori ty 119.
King Stephan put a low value on the compensation being offered by
Rudolf's commissaries. On September 26 he wrote a stinging answer to Possevino's suggestion of September 21 that the Emperor's offer should be accepted.
The King attacked the Imperial commissaries: their arguments, drawn «from the
rules of arithmetic» to inflate the value of Nagybanya and deflate that of Szatmar, were inane. BMhory trusted rather the evidence of his own eyes-he knew
the places in question from personal experience. What he wanted back was his
Szatmar:
<<I would consider the smoke of my own property sweeter than the hidden treasures
buried in the bowels of the earth at Nagybanya ... What keeps his Imperial Majesty from
returning to me my property?»

Doing so would do more to solidify friendship
«than a thousand quibbling and verbose treatises which induce more annoyance than
conviction ... Why does not the Emperor return the villages? The only reason is avarice.
.... Henceforward I can hope for nothing great and solid from the friendship of his
majesty ..... I have thought often within me that it would have been better for me never to
have started this negotiation, than having started it, for it to be carried on in such a childish way and to proceed with little or no hope of future goOd»120.

The negotiations at Cassovia collapsed on October 18 and 19. Bishop
Bomemissza, the leader of the Imperial commissaries, explained to Berzeviczy
and Possevino that the delays in responding to Berzeviczy's complaints about
the offered compensation being inadequate grew out of differences among the
Emperor's advisors. He repeated the claim that the Emperor's offer was more
than equal and satisfactory, so that the friendship pact between Poland and the
Empire should go forward. Later that day the Emperor's commissaries sang the
praises of the lands he was offering, especially the inexhaustible veins of metal
in the minesl2l .
The next day Berzeviczy gave the Imperial commissaries a long letter
which attacked the earlier delays and argued that they were a ploy to embarrass
the Polish King. That is why Bathory had earlier decided to order him home.
Only Possevino's intercession with the King and the nuncio's coming to Cassovia had induced Bathory to hold back his decision to break off the negotiations 122 .

119 Ibid., 63r. On September 12 Bathory wrote to Possevino that if there were an agreement to
hand over Nagybanya and the other towns and villages offered by the Emperor, Possevino was
authorized to have Berzeviczy accept the conditions of the Imperial commissaries on an interim
basis provided that they promised to give other villages in place of those requested by the King if
these could not be, given. SIEMIENSKJ, III, 435.
120 MPV VI, 576.
121 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 126-128.
122 Ibid., 128.
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Years ago the Emperor Maximilian had led Bathory to believe that he would get
back his hereditary possessions, but nothing happened in all the intervening
years while income from the lands had gone to the Habsburgs. Repeatedly
Berzeviczy's letter indicated his exasperation over the delays during the previous four months of negotiations. He went on to denigrate specific aspects of the
compensation being offered: for instance, he noted that much of the income
from the vineyards was earmarked for the Church and that the mines involved
dangerous work and uncertain income but required large capital investments as
compared to agriculture 123.
At the end of his letter Berzeviczy returned to what he considered the key
issue: the honor of the Polish King. In refutation of the claims that the compensation was more than equivalent he repeated Bathory 's offer: if the Emperor returned Szatmar and Nemethy, Bathory would demolish the fortifications and
give the Emperor 30,000 thalers, the cost of the fortifications, and a promise to
sign the pact of perpetual friendship. He concluded with a bombshell: if the
commissaries had nothing more to offer, his remaining in Cassovia was pointless. He was preparing to leave the next morning 124.
That evening the Imperial commissaries sent him a memo complaining that
his long letter contained nothing that had not already been discussed, but they
admitted to having nothing new to offer and to being without instructions from
the Emperor. Berzeviczy responded by saying that he was committed to leaving
and wished them a good trip home. In the morning of October 20 he sent them a
note commending them for their zeal and Possevino for his efforts for the common good, even through the negotiations had failed, but he claimed that it would
be unworthy of the King 's dignity for him to continue the negotiations 125 . One of
the Imperial commis:;;aries, Count Nogarola, was in turn so incensed by Berzeviczy's behavior that he later told Possevino that it was unworthy of the Emperor to have further dealings with Bathory 126 .
That day Possevino met briefly with the Imperial commissaries and said
that it
"pained him that in this whole affair, in which he had been involved for the whole
year with complete sincerity, he had been unable to bring either of the princes to the point
of outdoing the other in generosity».

123 Ibid., 129r-131r. Possevino reported to Gregory XIII that Felix Haberstein, one of the Imperial commissaries, held a contract controlling the mines and had furnished Berzeviczy with arguments about their profitability, thereby complicating the negotiations. Haberstein seems to have
been motivated by the desire to retain his control of the mines whether they remained under the
Emperor or whether they were awarded Bathory (by ingratiating himself with Berzeviczy and Bathory): POSSEVINO, Transilvania, 170. Following the Acta of the Cassovia meeting there are seven folios which list the income from Szatmar, Nemethy, Nagybanya and of the other villages
being offered in compensation, including information on the mines: ARSI Opp. NN. 317 135142.
124 Ibid., 131r. POSSEVINO'S Transiivania, 170, written for Gregory XIII, speaks harshly of Berzeviczy' s high-handed manner in dealing with the Imperial commissaries.
125 ARSI Opp. NN 317 131-133.
126 LuKAcs, II, 593.
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He urged them not to leave Cassovia until they h~d written both monarchs
about the breakup of negotiations. The Imperial commissaries agreed to this.
Possevino promised them that he would stay at Cassovia until a messenger returned from Biithory; he also promised to send Biithory their proposals 127 .
Meanwhile Possevino wrote to both Bathory and the Emperor to prevent a
total breakdown of the negotiations. Possevino sent letters to the King on October 19 and 20. The first, before Berzyviczy's bombshell, noted that the King was
already aware of the impasse; Possevino pleaded that he had tried to make clear
Biithory's sincerity and goodwill to the Emperor despite hostile elements at the
Imperial court. He urged the King to be patient and promised that he would write
and encourage the Emperor to act promptly. As a favor to the Pope he asked
Bathory for authority to break off negotiations if the Emperor made no new offer
or to agree on minor points if the Emperor made concessions since the lands in
questions were of minor importance. Such powers would speed up negotiations.
Possevino suggested that it would be good if he were to visit Krak6w, Prague
and Saxony to promote an alliance because he could accomplish much more
face to face than through correspondence 128 .
His letter of the evening of October 20 was accompanied by various other
letters and documents which demonstrated his efforts to prevent a breakdown of
the negotiations. Possevino claimed that the Imperial commissaries, having
pledged three more villages, said that they had no authorization to concede anything further and begged Possevino to persuade the King not to ask for more.
Possevino promised to try. When questioned further on whether they had power
to hand over the possession of Nagybanya and the other villages, they said they
could promise ratification but would have to seek the Emperor's permission as
regards the actual take-over of the lands. A response on that point would take
from twenty to twenty-five days. Possevino promised them that he would wait
for an answer from the Emperor. He asked Bathory to have either Berzyviczy or
another noble man on hand at Cassovia to await the Emperor's reply129.
The next day Possevino wrote the Emperor and told him that Berzeviczy
was leaving on the King's orders despite all his own efforts to persuade him in
the name of the Holy See to stay at Cassovia and wait for the Emperor's response. Possevino recapitulated that status of the negotiations: Biithory had
promised in an autograph letter not to fortify Nagybanya and to renew the
friendship pact with Rudolf. Possevino had also persuaded him to surrender his
claim to a few small villages and their peasants near Szatmar in return for their
equivalent elsewhere. Since the Emperor had offered the three villages of Lazar,
Bozonta and Totfalu, the dispute could have ended, but Berzyviczy's declaration
had prevented that. Possevino begged the Emperor to make new and prompt of-

ARSI Opp. NN. 317 134r.
Ibid., 77v-78v. For parts of this letter not dealing with the Szatmar negotiations, see LuKAcs, II, 555.
129 ARSI Opp. NN. 317 78v-79r.
127
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fer : «he who gives quickly gives twice». He suggested obliquely that the delay
in the Emperor's previous offer, quite as much as its substance, had alienated
Bathory and his commissary. Possevino went on to suggest that the Pope would
be agreeable to his immediately coming to see Rudolf personally. Possevino
suggested to the Emperor that Bathory's actions may have derived from his fear
of the Turks, but were Imperial kindness to take the initiative, Bathory would
likely agree to ending the dispute 130 . Rudolf's response to the evolving situation
was anything but prompt, for on 10 December Possevino was complaining to
Bonomi, the nuncio to the Emperor, that he still had not received a reply. On the
same day he sent Rudolf a second letter seeking a decisionl31.
BMhory's reply was as prompt as Rudolf's was slow. The King wrote Possevino on October 27 and made it clear that Berzeviczy had not been acting on
his own. Bathory castigated the Emperor for «showing himself so difficult in
these minor matters». Having once made clear his proposal, Bathory felt that for
him to change it like some merchant haggling over prices would be inconsistent
with his dignity. The King claimed he was now going to reveal to Possevino for
the first time the reason for his stubbornness. In doing so he was implicitly pushing aside Possevino's arguments for his accepting the Emperor's offer. Bathory
argued that acceptance would expose his relatives (who were his co-claimants to
the villages to be given as compensation) to inconvenience, injury and the possible confiscation of their goods by the Emperor. «The result would be that they
would raise everywhere a public outcry and complaint against us. To avoid that,
we are prepared rather to endure ourselves any kind of inconvenience in our own
fortunes». This is the reason why the King stood by the instructions he had given
Berzeviczy either to obtain the villages or return home with the business unfinished. The King cOI\tinued, «This is now the final statement of our mind; he can
expect no other from us». If the Imperial commissaries granted him the villages,
then the negotiations could be concluded in God's name, and they could hand
over possession to Berzeviczy as soon as possible. Should they lack that power,
they should seek it immediately from the Emperor. Berzeviczy had been authorized to leave Cassovia. Somebody would be sent to take possession if the Emperor agreed. The King authorized Possevino to deal with the Emperor about the
King's sending commissaries or an ambassador to renew the friendship pact132.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE CASSOVIA NEGOTIATIONS

Possevino stayed in Cassovia another three months, partly writing his Transilvania for Gregory XIII, partly trying tp restart the negotiations. The timing of
the friendship pact gradually emerged as a roadblock to a: settlement. Both sides
claimed they wanted it. The Emperor wanted to finalize the pact before handing
over territorial compensation for Szatmar. BMhory was opposed to linking the
pact directly to the Szatmar negotiations and held out for signing the pact only
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Ibid., 79-80.
LuKAcs, II, 588.
MPV VI, 626.
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after the compensation agreed upon had been handeq over to him, otherwise it
might seem to his Polish subjects that he had obligated Poland to something as a
price for regaining his family lands in Transylvania. An unnamed Imperial commissary came to Possevino at Cassovia and told him frankly that the Polish King
would never be given possession of the places designated as compensation unless he first renewed that pact 133 .
Since Bathory had earlier quietly authorized Possevino to negotiate the
friendship pact, provided certain conditions were met, five days after Berzeviczy's departure Possevino took the problem into his own hands and wrote
Archduke Ernest, the Emperor's brother and governor of Imperial Hungary. He
promised Ernest that the pact would certainly be ratified as soon as possession of
the towns and territories agreed upon for compensation were handed over. Possevino told him that the reason for this was that Bathory needed to keep separate
the affairs of Poland, where he was elected king of Poland and worked under
many constitutional restraints, from the affairs of Transylvania, where he was an
hereditary nobleman and the de facto regent for his young nephew Sigismund 134 .
Possevino also told the Archduke that if there were no compensation, there
would be no friendship pact. Linkage between the two must remain de facto, not
de jure. He assured Ernest that if the details of the compensation were worked
out, he was certain that the pact would follow, for the King had promised him as
much both orally and in a letter written in the King's own hand. «If full power
were given the Imperial commissaries, then the business can be concluded with
ease». Such a step would quiet BMhory's fears that once the friendship pact was
signed, the compensation might not be forthcoming. The Turks, who feared the
pact, would have no opportunity to stir things up. The settlement of the dispute
would be welcome by the Pope, who was involved in the question, and by the
Polish senators, who would see it as a sign of the Emperor's good will toward
their kingdom. Possevino told Ernest that his viewpoint was shared by Jan
Zamoyski, the powerful Polish Grand Chancellor 135 • Possevino's letter also in-

133 « ... io credo ch'il pili importante sara che l'Imperatore non vorra dare possesso della ricompensa di Satmar senza vedere prima rinovati i patti co'l Regno di Polonia; al che fin ' hora iI Re
non ha voluto accosentire» . Possevino to Cardinal Gallio, 21 November 1583: ibid., 663.
134 POSSEVINO, Transiivania, 167; Possevino to Ernest, 25 October 1583, ARSI Opp. NN. 317
81-83. Possevino also wrote to Ernest as viceroy for Habsburg Hungary on 21 October and exhorted him to work toward a settlement since that would curb unrest. He used the letter to attack Protestant officials who made Catholic worship so difficult in Habsburg Hungary that, Possevino
claimed, Catholics had more freedom in Turkish Hungary. Ibid., 80-8!'
135 Ibid., 82. In his letter to Ernest of October 21 Possevino noted that he had secured the support of August, Duke of Saxony and the most powerful of the German Protestant princes, for a
settlement of the dispute between Rudolf and Bathory. He also urged that a settlement would
serve to lessen the antipathy of Hungarians toward the Emperor and their sympathy toward Bathory, who was of Hungarian ancestry. ARSI Opp. NN. 317 81r. Also see MPV VI, 551n. In a letter to Johann Rueber, a Protestant, (17 November 1583) Possevino recalled that the Duke of Saxony had twice written to King Stephan urging that a settlement of the Szatmar dispute was in the
interests of the Empire and of Christendom. KARP ATHY- KRAVJANSZKY, 190. The Duke wrote Bathory again on 30 April 1584 to urge a settlement: MPV VII, 279n.
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voked his role as nuncio and told the Archduke that the settlement of the dispute
could be of greatest importance for uplifting the Kingdom of Hungary, for it was
close to the Pope's heart that from the settlement something much greater could
come. He did not have to spell out an anti-Turkish alliance 136.
Possevino 's appeal to Archduke Ernest was largely successful, for the Emperor agreed that his offer of Nagybanya and the other territories would be made
to Stephan not as King of Poland but to the house of Bathory as recompense for
their patrimony; the ten portiones or villages near Szatmar would remain feudatory property within the Kingdom of Hungary and subject to the same obligations borne by the other nobles of the Kingdom 137 . The Emperor's response on
this point was slow in coming-on December 7 Possevino was complaining to
Cardinal Gallio that he was still waiting for it138. By mid November Berzeviczy
had returned to Cassovia, but his return brought little joy to the Imperial commissaries, for he spent his time traveling the surrounding countryside. He
claimed that he was going hunting, or looking after his health, or seeking fodder
for his horses, but Bornemessza and the other Imperial representative feared that
his conversations with the local inhabitants might involve subversive activity139.
On December 10, while still awaiting the Imperial reaction to the stalled
negotiations and his initiatives to Archduke Ernest, Possevino wrote to Bathory
and suggested three possible reasons for the delays. First, the Emperor was unprepared to defend Habsburg Hungary from Turkish attack, and the Turks may
have warned Rudolf against reaching an agreement with BMhory, even though
Possevino felt that the Emperor personally desired such an agreement. Secondly,
his advisors considered his offer of compensation was more than fair, so that
BMhory's request for increased compensation was demeaning to the Emperor.
Likewise BMhory's postponement of the friendship pact was offensive to many
at court, especially the Spanish faction. Thirdly, some of the Emperor's advisors
might be fearful that Bathory's steadfast adherence to his demands might result
in more «indignities» to the Emperor when the friendship pact came to be finalized. Possevino argued that were BMhory in the Emperor's place, he too would
be fearful of the Sultan's power and his desire to take over all of Hungary140. Possevino suggested that should the Emperor 's agents spin out more delays, he
should go and talk with Rudolf personally. Were the Imperial advisors (perhaps
out of fear of the Turks) to insist that possession could not he handed over before
the friendship pact was concluded, he would like to see the business concluded

136 «Etenim cum propensissima Summi Pontificis mens sit, ut hac re composita, aliquid aliud
ad Divinam gloriam ad res Christianas statuendas sine strepitu et sine periculo disponatur». ARSI
Opp. NN. 317 8Ov. In his Transilvania (p. 168) Possevino gave Gregory XIII several additional
reasons why he was anxious to avoid linking the friendship pact de jure with the Szatmar compensation. One was that linkage might give Polish Protestant grounds to claim papal interference
in their national affairs.
137 Transilvania, 168.
138 MPV VI, 700.
139 Ibid., 701 n; Transilvania, 170.
140 MPV VI, 707 708.
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on the basis of the agreements made so far, so as not .to give an opportunity for
those at the Imperial court who opposed an agreement to raising new difficulties l4l. Toward the end of December the Imperial Council of State met and decided against increasing the compensation to be offered Bathory. Some argued
that increased compensation was a small price to pay for an alliance with
BMhory, but the prevailing view was that the current offer was fully equivalent
to Szatmar142.
On the last day of 1583 Possevino reported to Cardinal Gallio that he and
Berzeviczy were still waiting at Cassovia and that on the previous day letters
had gone to Archduke Ernest urging him to hurry a response from the Emperor.
He felt that the Imperial advisors were caught between fears for the Emperor's
dignity and fear that BMhory might break off relations. As for BMhory, Possevino wondered why he was so stubborn, since he had many good reason to accept the Emperor 's offer143 • Possevino 's growing distaste for the endless negotiations was exacerbated by his living conditions at Cassovia, where he and his Jesuit companion had to spend four months «in two small rooms like a prison» at a
local hostell 44 . He also disliked the two leading commissaries he had to deal with.
Rueber, the Imperial general, resided at Cassovia; he was very polite to Possevino, but he was a Calvinist and had suppressed Catholic worship in the surrounding region so that Possevino had to celebrate Mass in his small rooms 145 .
Berzyviczy, Possevino declared, was «a Calvinist and has done various diabolical things» 146.
TOWARD A FINAL SETrLEM ENT

The year 1584 and the first months of 1585 brought the long negotiations of
the Szatmar dispute toward an amicable conclusion. January 1584 found Possevino still awaiting the Emperor's response. Berzyviczy returned to the Polish
court in mid December despite the plea of Archduke Ernest that he remain at
Cassovia awaiting the Emperor's response to the latest proposals, specifically

141 Ibid., 709. Rueber suggested to Possevino that Turkish military operations in Transylvania
and Hungary were designed to pressure the timid at the Imperial court into postponing a settlement and an alliance with the Polish King: Possevino to Zamoyski, 5 october 1583. SIEMIENSKI
III, 220. Possevino argued just the opposite in a letter to Rueber (17 November 1583): If a PolishImperial pact was not signed, in the coming summer there might be a Turkish invasion of Habsburg Hungary. J(ARpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 190. Sathory called a meeting of the Polish Diet to
treat with the Turkish menace to Transylvania: Lippomano 's report of 13 December 1583, ibid.,

191.
Lippomano 's report to Venice, 27 December 1583: ibid., 192.
MPV VI 730
144 Ibid., 37:
.
145 LuKAcs II, 588594. After Rueber died 23 March 1584, Lippomano rated his military skills
very highly and regarded his death as a major loss to the Habsburgs. His post went to the Catholic
Count Ferdinando di Nogarola partly because the Hungarians were strongly opposed to another
German getting the office of commanding general in Hungary. Dispatch of 3 April 1584: KARPATHy-KRAVJANsZKY, 194-195.
146 MPV VII, 48.
142
143
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that three more villages with their peasants would be given Bathory 147. On January 6 Bathory wrote Possevino and again bitterly complained about the Emperor's delaying tactics and said that recently he had told the nuncio Bolognetti that
he doubted a favorable outcome from the negotiations. Bolognetti was more
hopeful and urged patience. The King told Possevino to refrain from further negotiations in Berzyviczy's absence 148 . Four days later Bolognetti wrote the King
and again begged him not to break off negotiations; the delays were to be more
attributed to the excessive care of Rudolf's minsters and the press of other business than to any desire of the Emperor to slight the Polish King 149 .
The Emperor sent a letter to Possevino on December 23 promising to satisfy the Polish King and put an end to the dispute 150, but the «Final Response» of ·
his commissaries, addressed to Berzyviczy on 7 January 1584, made several
concessions but was also hedged with conditions. The Szatmar compensation
package was not to be linked directly to the friendship pact. The Emperor agreed
to add the three villages (Lazar, Bozonta and T6tfalu) to the compensation package, as suggested by his commissaries, but refused other villages near Szatmar.
B<ithory was not to fortify Nagybanya and the villages given him and was to receive them not as the King of Poland but as a member of the Bathory family.
Hence they were to remain part of Hungary and as such under Rudolf's jurisdiction as King of Hungaryl5l.
Possevino sent Berzeviczy a long memo which urged the acceptance of the
Emperor's offer of compensation with minor conditions 152. The memo in fact
seems as much aimed at the King as at his chancellor, and develops the case for
accepting the Emperor's offer which Possevino had suggested in letters to the
King and to Bolognetti back on September 21153. Possevino argued in his memo
that a major difficulty was that while Nagybanya and the other compensation
were to be given to the B<ithory family, ten villages (portiones) were to be retained by the Emperor because they were said to be needed for the Szatmar
fortress 154 . Their possession would be given only under feudal obligations (bona
feudaria), for the Hungarian kings could not alienate Hungarian territory. Moreover the towns and the ten villages would pay the normal taxes to Rudolf as
Hungarian king. Possevino recounted the many advantages these seeming re-
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Bath~ry 'to Possevino, 6 January 1584: ibid., 11-12.

Ibid., 19-20.
Ibid., 29n.
151 Ibid., 29n.
152 ASV Nunz. Germ. 94247-250. A different copy of the same document is partly reprinted in
MPV VII, 29n, where the editor dates it circa 15 January 1584.
153 Ibid., 575 for his letter to Bolognetti; SlEMlENSKI III, 214, for his letter to Bathory.
154 What is meant by portiones? The term comes up repeatedly in the negotiations. Other documents speak of «decem portiones seu villas», hence villages or estates (ARSI Opp. NN. 317167v)
and of «de portionibus iIIis rusticorum» (MPV VI, 706) and «portione di· rustici» (POSSEVINO,
Transilvania, 169), hence they include the peasants living and working in the villages. Elsewhere
Bathory derided the idea that Szatmar «without these portiones would not have enough wine, as if
indeed an abundance of wine were to come from these small portions (portiunculis) >> . MPV VII,
699. Here portiones is usually translated as villages.
149
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strictions would have and recalled how two years earliyr he had suggested to the
King low key negotiations when BMhory had first brought up the issue of reopening the Szatmar question. Then delays and failures would have reflected
less on the authority of the monarch. Having the lands as a Hungarian feudatory
would entail certain advantages for the BMhory family and serve as a sort of insurance after Stephan's death, given the uncertainly of Transylvanian politics
and the possibility that the Turks might invade their land or increase their tribute
or back a different family for the office of Prince of Transylvania. Reaching a
settlement with the Emperor would enhance Bathory's reputation among Christian princes because of his zeal for public tranqUillity.
Anticipating the potential objection that the King's acceptance of Nagybanya under feudal conditions might seem to be subjecting the King of Poland to
another prince, Possevino pointed out, among other examples, that Philip II was
a feudatory of the Emperor for the Duchy of Milan without losing his dignity
and that God used such bonds among princes to keep them from being enslaved
by the Turks. Finally Szatmar itself, when it had belonged to the BMhory family,
owed feudal obligations to the Hungarian kings 155 . About January 20 Possevino
left Cassovia for Krakow; he wrote Bathory while on the way and urged him to
agree to the Emperor's offer since its conditions were acceptable 156 . He repeated
his plea from Krakow on January 28157.
BMhory was anything but pleased by the Emperor's offer. He wrote a bitter
letter to Possevino on January 28, accusing the Emperor of insincerity. Some
people, BMhory charged, thought that he had exceeded the requirements of his
dignity, but he preferred to be seen as putting concord ahead of his dignity. «We
therefore now think we should have nothing further to do with his Imperial
Majesty about these matters». Bathory's ironic postscript said that the Emperor
had a wonderful way of achieving peace and ended by putting Satan's words to
Christ into Rudolf's mouth (Mt. 4:9): «I will give you all these things if you fall
down and adore me». The King's response must have shaken Possevino. He
rewrote the King's letter and made it a bit milder; on it he wrote a note that
Berzeviczy had not yet reported to the King nor given him Possevino's own letter of January 28. These, Possevino hoped, might mellow the King 158 .
Despite the King's claim that he was going to break off the Szatmar negotiations, he continued to receive and study the reports and papers of the Cassovia

ASV Nunz. Germ. 94 247-250.
ASV Nunz. Pol. 158 37l.
157 Ibid., 386.
158 Both versions of the King's letter are printed in MPV VII, 45-46; for Possevino annotations,
ibid., 46n. On January 22 Cardinal Bolognetti had written Cardinal Gallio about the King's depressed mood : ibid., 32. On January 31 Possevino wrote to Gallio about the King 's desire for continuous military activity may have been a sort of escapism «<il desiderio di vol ere sempre esser in
armi gli facesse far qualche scappata in quello che piu d' una volta ho visto i cenni»): ibid., 48.
From May 1585 to December 1586 Bathory lapsed into deep depression: DAVIES I, 432. His stubbornness, bitterness and preoccupation with his dignity during the Szatmar negotiations seem
early symptoms of approaching mentaf instability.
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negotiations 159 . Having done so, he wrote Possevino on February 11 to say that
«We are not at all pleased with the response of the Emperor nor can We be». The
Emperor's representatives had spun things out for months only to come up with
an unsatisfactory solution. «We shall therefore now abstain from further dealings with them, for that is what they want, and commit our cause to both God
and to time»160. Ironically the same day, ignorant of the King's letter, the nuncio
Bolognetti wrote to encourage Possevino and praise him since «no ill will is
enough to obscure the light of those things which with true zeal and an open
heart are undertaken or the service of God and his holy church»161. Meanwhile
King Stephan had more important things to worry about: a rebellion in Livonia
and rumors of a truce between the Sultan and the Shah 162 .
Possevino received notice of the King's displeasure with the outcome of
the Casso via negotiations on February 17. This must have been doubly depressing, for it meant that not only were four months of his own work apparently
wasted, but more important, good relations between the two monarchs and their
alliance against the Turks was as far away as ever. Nonetheless the next day Possevino wrote the King and tried to persuade him to continue efforts toward an
understanding. Possevino used as his point of departure information he had recently received from Simon Forgach, an Imperial official in Hungary. Forgach
felt that unless Bathory showed some openness to a settlement, perhaps on
somewhat better conditions, people would apply to him the proverb, «He who
wants to get rid of a friend looks for an excuse». Possevino argued that the Emperor's proposal would not have imposed the conditions he had «unless all the
Hungarian counsellors had proven on oath that it was necessary for the Kingdom
of Hungary». He asked BMhory, who knew Hungarian conditions perfectly, to
provide him with arguments he could use to undermine this contention; Possevino would advance the arguments without using the King's name. Possevino
partly defended the Emperor, who had not tried to take advantage of the Turkish
incursions into Transylvania nor made an issue «of the harsh responses of a cer-

159 Possevino wrote (4 February 1584) to Bolognetti that he had sent Zamoyski a full account of
the meetings which the King had urgently requested. Berzeviczy made his own report to the King.
MPV VJl, 49-50. Six days later Bolognetti reported to Cardinal Gallio that the King was much
occupied with «a huge bundle of letters from Transylvania», which Bolognetti thought dealt with
the Szatmar negotiations. MPV VII, 68. He added a postscript that he had just received a letter
[that of 28 January noted above] from Possevino defending his role in the Szatmar negotiations.
Possevino wrote it in Latin so that Bolognetti could show it to the King. Bolognetti sent it to Bathory together with his own cover letter and told Gallio that he would talk to the King in a few
days when the King came to Vilnius, but since his information was second hand, he doubted if his
words would carry much weight in preventing <<the efforts of Berzeviczy from prevailing in the
heart of the King over the accounts of the Father [Possevino]». Ibid., 70.
160 MPV VII, 72. As Bonomi pointed out to Bolognetti (27 July 1584) in Poland decisions
could be made quickly by Bathory, but in Prague he and Possevino had to deal with Rudolf himself, then his advisors, and then decisions affecting Hungary had to be referred to Archduke Ernest, the governor of Hungary, and his council: ibid., 376. The next month Possevino warned Bolognetti that at Prague <<il difetto di ogni minima cosa genera dilationi in quel consiglio». Ibid.,
409.
161 Ibid. , 74 . .
162 Ibid., 78.
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tain person» [obviously Berzeviczy]. Possevino had. ascertained and Forgach
had confirmed that Bathory's relatives in Hungary regarded as acceptable the
feudal obligations tied to the return of the properties, especially if they could be
modified. Indeed, a link to the Emperor was desirable for them, otherwise they
might be open to Turkish threats. Perhaps a bit forgetful of his role as nuncio,
Possevino describes himself as the King's most faithful servant when he begged
the King to provide him with a document that would show everybody that the
King was rejecting conditions governing the settlement not because of his own
wish but for reasons of justice. He asked the King to write him letters authorizing him to keep the negotiations going163 .
The same day Possevino wrote Bolognetti and said that while he had expected the King's letter to bring him the greatest pain he had ever experienced,
he had not lost hope despite the breakdown of the negotiations. One reason for
his hope (something that he deliberately had not mentioned in his letter to the
King but did mention to Bolognetti) was the fact that those favoring a settlement
could count on the support of Jan Zamoyski, the powerful Grand Chancellor.
Possevino asked Bolognetti to support his efforts and to discuss the matter with
Zamoyski after first pledging his wholehearted efforts for a settlement l64 . A gentle conspiracy was forming to bring the King around.
Zamoyski wrote Possevino on February 13 and describes how dejected he
was over the breakdown of negotiations but how he had taken heart because the
differences involved only a few minor villages. Keeping in mind how Possevino
had always insisted that what was really important in the negotiations was the
«public advantage of the Christian name» Zamoyski had left his estates and
sought out the King, with whom he had discussed the conditions for taking possession of the lands being offered for compensation. In Hungary these feudal
obligations include an oath of allegiance, paying taxes, and military service,
among other things, and these obligations bound the nobility not only to the
monarch but also to his lieutenants. To accept such conditions would involve an
indignity to somebody of Bathory stature. Undertaking them would open the
King to criticism in Poland. Zamoyski had therefore sought out in his discussion
with the King what had been the earlier obligations tied to Szatmar. The King
had informed him that the Szatmar lands were held not as a part of Transylvania,
but as a part of the Kingdom of Hungary. Reflecting later on his discussion with
the King, Zamoyski thought he could find a legal loophole so that Bathory could
rightly escape unacceptable conditions for the new lands. Since there was question of taking possession of new lands, a mere letter of investiture could be used,
without an oath or homage or other burdens. «I calculated that on this basis ...
the dignity of his Imperial Majesty could be taken into account and all the difficulties avoided which his Royal Majesty has seen». But Zamoyski felt it would
be best for Possevino to broach the question with BMhory on a less formal basis.
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If Possevino were to do SO, Zamoyski promised his full backing to bring the
whole business to the end «from which your Paternity was wont to promise so
much good not only for both realms but for all Christendom»165.
Possevino's efforts to get an accord had not enjoyed much success, and
March 3 Cardinal Gallio wrote him that his expense account had been cut in
half, from 100 to 50 scudi per month 166 . This action suggests that Rome was becoming impatient with negotiations that seemed to be endlessly protracted. Even
before he got this bad news Possevino was writing Gallio (13 March 1584) from
Prague to apologize for the delays; he argued that the negotiations between
Rudolf and Bathory had not cost «the Apostolic See anything either before God
or before these and other princes»; the Emperor would have less willing to offer
recompense, for prior to papal involvement the Imperial court had simply ignored Polish efforts to raise the question. The negotiations had provided an occasion «to treat of many other good causes here, and in Hungary, and in Poland
and in Saxony». The negotiations had led, for instance, to proposed papal subsidies for Bathory's building fortifications against the Turks at Illye and Mount
Aranyi 167 . Possevino also invoked his efforts to line up the Duke of Bavaria's
support for two of his pet projects, a colony of German Catholics for Transylvania and the establishment of a military academy to train Catholic officers. The
ongoing negotiations may have given the Turks pause, the Polish king had not
broken with the Emperor, and relations had improved l68 .
Better still was Bolognetti's letter of March 12 letter in Vilnius to Cardinal
Gallio that Bathory was eager for a war against the Turks, but was determined to
have the backing of the Emperor and the German princes before starting a conflict. He had also discussed the Szatmar question with the King, who «used
rather harsh words at the beginning», but the conversation confirmed Bolognetti
in the conviction ttlat the King could be brought around 169 .
Also on March 12 Bolognetti described for Possevino a recent audience
with Bathory which discussed the case for accepting the Emperor's conditions.
The King said he «was amazed how [Possevino] supposed that the conditions
proposed by the Emperor merited being accepted». Bathory claimed that God
had made him free, and he had no intention of surrendering his freedom for anything, much less something so unimportant; he said he was ashamed to have
wasted so much effort over the affair and having involved the Holy See in it. The
peace of Christendom did not depend on Szatmar or Nagybanya. As for seeking
concord with the Emperor, he had done his part. Bolognetti still found some
hope in the King's words, for he becarp.e more calm as their discussion progressed and claimed that he had never asked for the dismemberment of Hungary
nor the incorporation of the territories into Transylvania. Bolognetti suggested

III, 264-266.
MPV VII, 114.
Possevino described the fortress project for Gregory XIII in his Transilvania, p. 182.
MPV VII, 133-135.
Ibid., 125-127.
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that Possevino should hasten to the Imperial Court and build on the last statement of Bathory; he should try to keep the negotiations going and make sure that
Rudolf did not withdraw his offer. Bolognetti wrote that he wanted to believe
that the Emperor's response would be «very good and conformed to all our
desires» 170.
Possevino had already been in Prague several days when he wrote Bathory
on March 12 to say that since he had received nothing to communicate to the
Emperor on the compensation issue, he had evaded the issue when questioned
whether the Emperor's offer was acceptable. He told Bathory that he had deliberately not shown Imperial officials Bathory's letter to him of February 11 rejecting the Imperial offer l7l since he hoped that new information might have
changed the King's mind 172 .
Possevino had a long audience with the Emperor on March 22 which built
on preliminary discussions with Imperial officials and led to several breakthroughs 173. Possevino showed Rudolf the letter Zamoyski had sent him on
February 13 which suggested a loophole that would allow Bathory not to take
any unacceptable oaths or feudal obligations which would subordinate him to
the Emperor. Rudolf indicated that he was pleased by Possevino's work and that
he had not given up hope of an agreement174. Zamoyski's letter arrived only two
day before Possevino's audience with Rudolf; on receiving it Possevino was jubilant for he had a powerful new argument to circumvent Bathory's unwillingness to take an oath and accept feudal obligations that would seem to subordinate him to the Emperor. Aside from indignity to Polish Kingship, an oath to
Rudolf would poison Bathory's relations with the Sultan as overlord of Transylvania. Possevino wrote to Zamoyski the day before his meeting with the Emperor: «May God bless your Illustrious Lordship again and again, for whom God
(as in other things) has perhaps preserved the greatest palm and role in the agreement». Unless a loophole or technicality was found, the friendship between the
princes might dissolve, «without which I see that all of Hungary and Transylvania will fall into ruin» 175.
Possevino's correspondence does not spell out the details of his conversation with Rudolf, but they are given in a dispatch of Lippomano to Venice of 27
March 1584. Bathory would not have to take an oath, so as not to anger the Sultan. Rudolf had turned the decision, as usual, over to his Council of State. The
actual lands being offered were Nagybanya and the rest of the previous offer,

170 Ibid., 127-129. Bathory wrote Possevino the same day and again claimed that he had never
desired the dismemberment of Hungary or the incorporation of the compensation into Transylvania. Ibid., 129n.
171 Ibid., 73.
172 Ibid., 130. This meeting with Imperial officials is probably the long meeting with Johann
Trautson, the Imperial privy counsellor, that Possevino described in his letter of March 13 to Cardinal Gallio: ibid., 138.
173 For the date of the audience, see Possevino's letter to Bolognetti, 23 March 1584: MPV VII,
149.
174 Possevino to Gallio, 28 March 1584: ibid., 160-161.
175 PO.$sevino to Zamoyski, 21 March 1584: SIEMIENSKl, 278.
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which was deemed acceptable to Biithory and had the advantage of being in
Transylvania, unlike the Szatmar lands which were in Hungary176.
The discussion then turned to the friendship treaty, which was far more
than a mere statement of friendship. The two crowns promised indissoluble
friendship so that should need arise they were to give support and help for the
common defense. Both foreswore designs on the other's territory. Rebelling vassals from one prince were not to be received by the other but driven away .
Should subjects of different princes have a quarrel that they could not resolve
themselves, the two princes would delegated a decision to joint representatives.
All roads and rivers were open to traffic by the merchants of the two countries.
Mechanisms were adopted to settle problems from subjects of one country committing outrages in the other 177 • At this juncture a final settlement of the dispute
seemed at hand.
The month of April threatened to undo the progress of March, at least if the
Venetian ambassador is to be believed. Officially the loophole suggested by
Zamoyski and presented to Rudolf by Possevino so that Biithory would not have
to take an oath to Rudolf as King of Hungary was turned over to Council of
Hungary (sitting in Vienna) for consideration 178. Rome remained optimistic, for
Gallio wrote Possevino that His Holiness would be greatly consoled by the common benefit a settlement would bring to both princes and all Christendom 179 . In
contrast, on April 3 Lippomano was reporting a minor diplomatic revolution
arising from improving relations between Biithory and the Turks and from deteriorating relations between the Habsburgs and the Turks. The Sultan had sent an
envoy to Biithory, who freed Turkish prisoners taken by the cossacks and had
the heads cut off some sixty cossacks in the presence of the envoy. One important court official at Prague (unnamed) recited for Lippomano a list of Biithory's
old grievances against the Habsburgs and accused him of quietly fostering the
growing discontent among the Hungarians, for instance by his refusal to take the
oath to Rudolf18o . On April 17 Lippomano reported that at Biithory's behest
Zamoyski had written to Possevino in Prague that the King had decided to go
back to his original demands: the return of Szatmar and his original family possessions, on the promise that he would dismantle the Szatmar fortifications and
pay the Emperor 30,000 scudi. «The negotiation has reached a worse stage than
ever before .... Father Possevino in short lives between hope and fear». The reason Lippomano gave for the reversal was that Biithory did not want to give the
Turks the impression that he enjoyed cordial relations with Rudolfl8l .
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Ibid., 194.
178 Possevino to GaJlio, 3 and 11 April 1584: MPV VII, 164 175.
179 Ibid., 205.
180 KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZ KY, 194-196.
181 Ibid., 197-198. Lippomano was being kept abreast of the negotiations by Possevino, who
sent him letters dated March 27, April 17 and May 9 (MPV VII, 215n) so he had good sources of
information. Possevino wrote Zamoyski from Prague on April 30 that he had heard about an accord between Bathory and the Turks and that he was still awaiting the Emperor's response, which
176 KARPATHY-KRAVJANSZKY,
177
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Faced with the stubbornness of both parties, Possevino tried a new ploy at
the end of April: Bathory should take over from his nephew Sigismund, for
whom he was de facto regent of Transylvania, the investiture of the places offered by the Emperor as recompense, but the Emperor was to free them from
taxes and other obligations. Initially neither side responded to this suggestion;
on May 1 the Emperor urged Possevino to go to Poland and see if Bathory
would accept Possevino's newest suggestion before he himself had to make a
decision, but Possevino developed a serious sore on one arm which prevented
his departure 182 . The Emperor took the unusual step of allowing Possevino to negotiate for him, under certain conditions, with BMhory. Nagybanya would be
given to Bathory and his family without any oath or onerous conditions but only
by a letter of investiture. The letter would be renewed in case the lord of the territory changed, but if the BMhory family were to die out entirely, the dominion
would revert to the Emperor183. Clearly Rudolf was accepting the legal maneuver
suggested by Zamoyski to avoid any oath or conditions that Bathory might regard as indignities.
Since Possevino's arm prevented his going in person to see BMhory, he
send the Emperor's response by courier. He was fearful that Turkish pressure
might deter the King from reaching a final settlement with Rudolf. Possevino
also suggested to Rudolf that the whole business be concluded either without
restitution of the ten villages (portiones) or that BMhory surrender his claims to
three of them and the other seven be given as restitution to his relatives, on condition that they could be exchanged for other territory l 84 . Rudolf agreed to his
suggestions 185 . Possevino requested from Rudolf an additional document clarifying the details 186 , to which Rudolf again responded favorably 187.
On May 14 Possevino wrote and asked Bathory to accept this arrangement
for the seven manors as the best that could be done 188 . The day previously he had

he was not pressing for, but <<I do not wonder over the delay, for I see how slowly everything else
is done here». SIEMIENSKl, III, 290.
182 Lippomano's dispatchs of May 1, 8 and 15: ibid., 198 199.
183 Rudolf II's response to Possevino, 1 May 1584: MPV VII, 223n. Possevino sent copies of
the Imperial document and his own response to it to Cardinal Gallio on May 8: ibid., 232. Bonomi, the nuncio to the Imperial court, was apparently present when Rudolf's response was given
to Possevino and related to Cardinal Gallio (1 May 1584) a conversation on that occasion with
Johann Trautson, the Emperor's Privy Counsellor. He asked Gallio to keep his account secret.
Trautson indicated that the Emperor's action was partly designed to prevent Bathory from adding
new conditions. Bonomi replied that given Bathory's bellicose nature and the fact that he had patched up his relations with the Turks, the Emperor would be well advised to move quickly toward
a settlement of their dispute. Trautson agreed and came close to admitting that because of these
reasons the Imperial court stood in fear of Bathory. Ibid., 224. For all that Poland and the Empire
were putting the final touches on the long deferred friendship pact, their real relation was one of
mutual distrust.
184 3 May 1584: MPV VII, 232n.
185 Possevino to Gallio, 15 May 1584; ibid., 246.
186 Ibid.
187 Possevino to Zamoyski, 13 May 13: SIEMIENSKl, II, 295. Possevino again thanked Zamo~ski for his crucial suggestion on how to get around the problem of an oath. Ibid.
1 8 MPV VII, 245n.
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written Zamoyski and said that he preferred to stay in Prague where he could
finish the negotiations quietly in the name of the Pope and to the honor of the
King. He felt that Bathory would be pleased with his work since he had done
nothing without Zamoyski's instructions and begged for freedom to clear up the
problem of the seven portiones189 •
B<ithory felt otherwise. He wrote Zamoyski on May 23 that Possevino
should shortly come to him at Grodno since he wanted to deal with Possevino
face to face and not by letters, «for our affairs with the Emperor are not going
forward sincerely but violently. We recoil from this agreement and are of two
minds and doubtful about what We should do» . In the next five lines of his letter
the King referred to his royal dignity three times and concluded:
«Let the Emperor grant us whatever he wants for our [relatives]; if he does not take
proper account of our dignity or injures it in the slightest way, we shall utterly repudiate
his offers, even if magnificent»I90.

B<ithory's hypersensitivity about his dignity did not augur well for the
prompt settlement which all the other parties involved were hoping for.
Bathory went on to tell Zamoyski about his hope that the Turks might become embroiled in war against the Tartars (<<diabolus cum diabolis»), for then
«our affairs would never be safer». He mentioned that two days earlier the nuncio Bolognetti had brought good news about a league of Christian princes
against the Turks. B<ithory claimed that his heart was in the project l9l .
Bolognetti wrote Cardinal Gallio a long account of his discussion with the
King, which lasted nearly four hours. The King reviewed several possible configurations of a league against the Turks and their chances of success and different strategies that ,might be employed, depending on which Christian powers
joined the league192.
On May 29 Bolognetti reported to Gallio on another audience with
Bathory. The King's wish that the Turks and Tartars become embroiled in war
was being fulfilled. Less welcome was Bathory's caustic remarks about the
Szatmar negotiations, for instance that he was not going to be satisfied with
going around begging for an answer from the Imperial court, that the Imperial
counsellors were searching for new pretexts to drag out negotiations and had
no intention of ever coming to closure. Bathory claimed that at the beginning
he had turned the whole business over to the wise judgement of the Pope.
Bolognetti replied that despite the fact that the Pope had embraced the project
and assigned the task to Possevino, who had spared no effort, the King had
gone ahead and appointed Bishop Rozdrazewski as his representative and had
thereby complicated procedures from the outset. Bolognetti wrote Gallio that

II, 295.
Ibid., 311-312.
Ibid., 312-313.
23 May 1584: MPV VII, 261-265.
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Possevino's presence at the Polish court was needed to disentangle the negotiati ons 193.
Meanwhile Possevino was still at Prague and ailing. On June 14 he reported
to Gallio that he had heard nothing from Bathory on the Szatmar question but
had receive a letter from Zamoyski 194. That letter (dated 29 May 1584) added details for a final settlement which Bathory had sent Zamoyski. The settlement
should make clear the dignity of Bathory's family and be written in honorificis
verbis and deal with the automatic inheritance of one family member on the
death of another, the line of descent being laid down by Bathory. Their inheritance was not to be encumbered by any fees. Zamoyski urged Possevino to send
him the text of the investiture documents as soon as possible so that he could
show them to the King, for that
«would bring no small hope of bending the heart of his Royal Majesty, especially if
to them is added the fact that his [Imperial] Majesty makes no more difficulties about
those other portiones, although they are small in themselves».

Zamoyski went on to hope that an end to the Szatmar dispute was at last at
hand. He added briefly two items of news with larger implications for the direction of Polish policy: a Polish-Turkish peace treaty and the death of Ivan the
Terrible 195 .
.
Since Possevino could not come to Poland, the task of dealing with Bathory
fell to Cardinal Bolognetti, as he reported to the Cardinal Secretary Gallio on
June 17. Possevino forwarded to Bolognetti several documents he had obtained
from the Emperor. Bolognetti took two forms to Bathory, one drawn up on the
usual form of mutual agreements (compatationes), the other in the form of a
concession made by the Emperor to the house of Bathory196. In the first document
Bathory made a few changes regarding the places named. Bathory repeated that
he was so tired of the whole affair and of the delaying tactics by the Emperor's
representatives that he had decided not to send them any more correspondence
or ambassadors on the issue, but he did not want to stop what the nuncios were
doing in obedience to the Pope. Bolognetti promised that Possevino would keep
working at Prague on the minor details still needed to finish the negotiations.
The one outstanding issue was the sharing of the income from the ten villages
being turned over to the Bathory, two thirds of which was to go to the Bathory
family, one third being retained by the Emperor in the Imperial offer. The discussion on this point was long, and Bolognetti urged the King to allow some
compromise for the sake of the Emperor's friendship. Bathory yielded and
agreed to forgo not only the three villages which he had been willing to give up
during the negotiations at Cassovia but two more. Bolognetti even tried to get

193 29 May 1584: ibid., 281-282.
194 Ibid., 296.
195 SIEMIENSKl, UI, 322. On June 19 Lippomano

reported the details of Zamoyski's letter to the
Venetian government, information which Possevino doubtless gave him: KARpATHY-KRAvJANSZKY, 200.
196 These documents seem to have disappeared: MPV VII, 304n.
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B<Hhory to promise to forego the other five or at least allow Possevino discretion
on the matter, but here the King refused to budge, nor would he allow his remaining five villages to pay the usual fees to the Emperor. Here Bolognetti foresaw the danger of new difficulties arising. At this juncture the King «replied to
me so expansively and with such determination and brought forward so many
arguments that I do not know if I can remember them». Most of the arguments
touched his dignity: fear that the impression he would leave his posterity was
that of a weak man who cared little about them or his own dignity, who was
looking out for his own interests rather than his family. The King recounted how
one village (Buli) went back in his family hundreds of years thanks to the valor
shown by one off his ancestors back in the crusades. He concluded by saying
that he was willing to give up five villages but would break off negotiations if
the Emperor would not give him the other five, but he asserted he had no intention of going to war over the issue. So determined was the King that Bolognetti
abandoned hope of gaining more concessions, «at least for now». Bolognetti
concluded that he was sending on information about the King' s concessions to
Possevino in Prague with the hope that he could use them to wrap up the whole
dispute there. He felt it unlikely that more concessions could be wrung from
B<Hhory and was fearful that the delicate issue of homage or subjection might
arise again 197 .
On June 23 Possevino wrote to Zamoyski about the progress of the Szatmar
negotiations. Since he was unsure of the King's reaction to the Emperor's most
recent statement on the issue, it seemed unwise for the Hungarian Chancery to
draw up as yet a formula of investiture, but he had a document from the Emperor
which rather explicitly dropped the oath and other burdens. He promised that he
would not allow the inclusion of anything that did not speak honorably of the
King and his family. Now that the negotiations were almost completed he
doubted if the Emperor would quibble over words. Possevino would avoid raising the question of the ten villages until he heard from Bathory, whom he hoped
to see in Lublin in August. The Emperor was being careful to take account of
B<Hhory's dignity in the negotiations, and Possevino foresaw no problems over
the projected friendship treaty. Once that was taken care of, the King could turn
his attention to the unfolding situation in Russia. Possevino went on to relate recent details of the fighting between Turks and Tartars 198 • Later Possevino related
to Gallio a conversation in which the Emperor suggested as soon as Possevino

197 Ibid., 303-307. Possevino and Bolognetti went over this discussion on August 1, when Possevino reached Warsaw. Possevino forwarded to Rudolf a detailed summary of the discussion on
August 3 together with a formula drawn up by Bathory's officials and approved by the King. It included a plea that there be no further delays in settling the dispute. Bathory insisted that he be given five villages, which were destined for his blood relatives (<<quae ad consanguinos suos pertinent» . These five he would not surrender, but he was willing to leave to the Emperor's decision
the question of the other five «<quae minus propinquos suos attingerent»). ARSI Opp. NN. 330
133r-134v. The fact that Bathory was childless and only the elected king of Poland may have conditioned his need to provide security for his relatives.
198 SIEMIENSKI, III, 335-337. Lippomano reported that Bathory 's attention was increasingly turned toward developments in Russia after the death of Ivan IV, so that both he and Rudolf had an
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spoke with Bathory in Lublin and obtained information about what the King
wanted, Rudolf would see to it that no more delays or difficulties would arise
from his side 199 .
While on his way to Lublin Possevino stopped on August 1 at Warsaw to
confer with Bolognetti on how to conclude the Szatmar affair 2OO • The discussion
turned on the details of the villages to be turned over to Bathory, but Bolognetti
could no longer remember the precise villages in question. Bolognetti argued
against having a statement on this or the investiture being formulated in Prague
since that would involve more delays 201.
By late August Possevino was in Lublin; after conferring with King
Stephan he reported to the King that he had written Prague on certain details of
their discussion: that the King had never read the details of the protocols governing his possession of Szatmar but was content that the same stipulations apply to
Nagybanya and its adjacent territory which was being given to him and to the
lands being given to his relatives as compensation. Possevino asserted his confidence that now «the whole business will be carried forward very nicely into effect ... and that as your Royal Majesty has come to know the whole mind of his
Imperial Majesty ... » a solid friendship between the monarchs could be established. Possevino rejoiced that Bathory had promised to provide him with a draft
of the friendship treaty before the Polish senators who had gathered for the Diet
at Lublin departed 202 •
The King wrote Gregory XIII on August 27 to praise Possevino and urged
the Pontiff to «trust him in all these affairs». The King stated that he had given
Possevino an oral message of great importance to bring the Pope personally but
did not specify its details 203 • Possevino confided to Cardinal Bolognetti that the
King was planning to attack Russia, which was in disorder after the death of
Ivan IV, and wanted papal subsidies for the project204 • An attack on Russia could
be seen either as a distraction from the papal project of an anti-Turk league or a
preliminary step toward forcing the Russians into a broader coalition.
On August 27 Bathory gave Possevino a written statement of his position
that paralleled their discussion a few days earlier. He gave Possevino broad
powers in dealing with the Emperor about five of the villages, the claim to which

. additional reason to wrap up the Szatmiir dispute. Dispatches of June 26 and July 24: KARPATHYKRAVJANSZKY, 20l.
199 17 July 1584: MPV VII, 366. If earlier the Emperor's side was the cause of most delays, during the later stages of the negotiations that dubious honor belonged to Biithory. Bonomi, the nuncio at Prague, wrote Gallio on July 17 about Possevino going to Lublin to end «this blessed agreement, about which we are astonished that no response has ever come from his Majesty». Rumors
were circulating in Prague that now the Biithory had achieved a favorable treaty with the Turks,
he was ha;boring sinister designs. MPV VII, 383n .
. 200 Bolognetti to Gallio, 2 August 1584: ibid., 383 .
201 Possevino to Gallio, 2 August 1584: ibid., 385 .
202 Ibid., 417. Possevino's letter to the King is undated; the editor ofMPV dates it circa August
25.
203 Ibid., 419.
204 Bolognetti to Gallio, 28 August 1584; ibid, 420.
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he was willing to forego. But Nagybanya and its adjacent territories were first to
be handed over to his free possession together with Buli and a village lying near
the fortress of Ziniriwarallia. The Emperor would be then given time to deliberate over the details of the remaining villages or equivalent compensation that the
King insisted upon. The compensation should be made to Bathory himself and to
the legitimate heirs of his three brothers and three sisters 205 . With these instructions in hand Possevino set out for Prague and Rome after some intermediate
stops. Meanwhile Gregory XIII had decided that while the Holy See was not opposed to Bathory's contemplated designs on Russia, neither was it about to back
the project without a great deal of reflection and making certain about the attitudes of the other powers and of the forthcoming Polish Diet. The papacy, moreover, was in no position financially to provide massive subsidies for Bathory's
designs. Therefore Gallio told Possevino not to come to Rome and to leave this
whole matter in the hands of Bolognetti and other papal representatives206 . Possevino arrived in Prague by mid October. Prospects for a final settlement seemed
good. His friend Lippomano reported to Venice that what was needed was «only
a few more honorable words in the instrument of compensation, which one thing
will be easily obtained>>207.
Negotiations did not go so easily. The Emperor noted two discrepancies
in Bathory's newest proposals compared to previous negotiations, one was the
number of villages in question, the other was the request that the investiture
could also pass through the female line 208 . Possevino referred these objections
back to Bathory for a decision 209 . Bolognetti wrote the King that he had heard
from Bonomi, the' nuncio in Prague, that Rudolf would allow him to change
the «formulation handed down by the Emperor as long as the substance itself
of the things agreed upon was not changed»21O. The King would have to decide
whether to act immediately or await Possevino's expected return from Prague211.

205 Ibid., 430n. About this time Bolognetti achieved some success in efforts to get Bathory to
moderate his demands. The King was willing to forego five portiones or villages but insisted on
being given the three he had obtained at Cassovia through Berzeviczy plus two more. At Bolognetti's urging, he agreed that they should pay the customary taxes to Rudolf as King of Hungary
but Nagybanya should be held under <<the sam~ law, form , privileges and conditions» that Szatmar and Nemethy had possessed: ibid., 699.
206 Gallio to Possevino, 29 September and 20 October 1584: ibid., 451' 452 462.
207 Dispatch of 16 October 1584. KARPATHY-KRAvJANszKY, 201. This was Lippomano's last
dispatch; Matteo Zane took over as Venetian ambassador at Prague in early November: MPV VII,
492. On November 5 Possevino wrote Bolognetti that he had been struck by fever fifty days previously: ibid.
208 Decree of the Emperor: 27 October 1584: ARSI Opp. NN 330 180r-181r.
209 1 November 1584: MPV VII, 491n.
210 11 November 1584: ibid., 501.
2ll Ibid., On 16 December 1584 Possevino had a conversation with Rudolf and tried to persuade him to allow investiture to the female line and grant the Bathory five portiones. Ibid.,
559n.
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The King decided that much might depend on a turn of phrase and thought
it best to wait till he could talk to Possevino 212 •
The year 1584 ended without resolving anything. The Polish Diet showed
little interest in an attack on the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. Their disinterest
suited papal policy nicely, as Bolognetti observed to Cardinal Galiio. The Pope
was of that hook213. The Emperor could also take quiet pleasure from the Diet.
The new Venetian ambassador at Prague, Matteo Zane, reported that the Emperor had less fear of the Polish King than in the past, not because of Rudolf's
own military strength, but because any move on the part of the King would not
enjoy the support of the Polish estates and would depend upon B<ithory's own
forces and not the Polish army, for the dispute was a private affair of the House
of Bathory. Zane predicted more delays in the negotiations214 . Possevino wrote
Gallio on December 31 that newly arrived clarifications from Bolognetti and
Zamoyski, which the Emperor had requested, might lead to minor adjustments 215 .
The next day Possevino presented to Rudolf a new phrasing that neither included nor excluded explicitly inheritance through the female line so that «the
compensation was to be handed on in same way that Szatmar was»216. On January 9 Rudolf informed him that he had forwarded his latest statement to Archduke Ernest, and that Possevino was welcome to remain in Prague awaiting the
Archduke's reply or to go ·to Poland, but the Emperor indicated that he preferred
his going to Poland to facilitate B<ithory's acceptance of the formula of investiture217 .
Possevino finally left Prague on January 15. As he was leaving he wrote
Cardinal Gallio and speculated that the Turks might take advantage of the prolonged negotiations to reach a peace with the Persians and turn their attention
to Hungary and that likewise Bathory might find Turkish support more valuable

212 Bolognetti to Possevino, 28 November 1584: ibid., 532n. On November 1 Blithory had written Bolognetti complaining about how equivocal the new Imperial proposals were and said he
wanted to discuss them with Possevino: «Scripturas istas de negotio Zatmari et Nemeti per leg imus, in quibus illas quas D.V. notavit aequivocationes animavertimus et has totas esse summo ingenio constructas et ordinatas, ipsaque adeo verba ea quadam arte compos ita, ut totum negotium
reddatur infestum. Retinendas vero apud nos ad P. Possevini adventum iudicavimus, ut cum eo
presente de iis conferamus ipsique men tern et sententiam nostram aperiamus». Ibid., 484.
213 11 December 1584; ibid., 547.
214 Dispatch of 11 December 1584: !URpATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 201 202. In his dispatch of December 25 Zane noted that Possevino was preparing to leave Prague to return to Poland; he had
been engaged partly with details of the Szatmlir dispute, partly with those of the friendship pact.
Ibid., 202. On December 29 Possevino wrote Bolognetti from Prague that he was still awaiting a
resRonse from the Emperor and hoped to leave within eight days: MPV VII 565.
5 Ibid., 566 567.
.
216 Ibid., 567n. On the same day Zane reported that Possevino was staying in Prague and trying
to acquire more latitude and authority from the Imperial ministers, but these were standing firm
because an attempt of a Polish king to use force would be checked by constitutional limits. Possevino meanwhile was stressing Blithory's strength and valor as a bargaining tool, so much so that
his impartiality was under suspicion. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 203. Zane repeated the accusation of partiality on January 15: ibid., 204.
217 ARSI Opp. NN. 330 223.
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for his interests in Poland and Transylvania and for his designs on Muscovy
than would be an agreement with the Emperor218.
On January 31 the Emperor, however, finally made a decision on the ongoing differences in a decree he gave to the new nuncio at Prague, Germanico
Malaspina, to pass on to Cardinal Bolognetti in Poland. The Emperor agreed to
increase his offer to the Polish King beyond the three districts (pagi) already
agreed on to include five additional villages (portiones) . These were handed
over, as had been suggested by Possevino, «in the way that Szatmar was, that is,
govern by the same conditions». The Emperor was doing this so that «his wholehearted zeal in establishing and strengthening mutual benevolence, friendship
and good neighborly relations with his Serene Majesty may be more evident».
The Emperor hoped that this decision would put a final end to the long negotiations 219 .
The decree was indeed the breakthrough which led to the final settlement.
Malaspina sent a copy through his assistant Pelegrino to Bolognetti, who passed
it on to Bathory, who was very pleased by it and said that he wold be prompt in
putting it into effect and having the negotiations concluded 22o . Still he passed it to
his Berzeviczy, Chancellor of Transylvania, to examine and make minor
changes. Later Bolognetti sent Malaspina a long dispatch which contained a
copy of Berzeviczy's careful revisions 221 •
On February 19 Possevino wrote Gallio from Warsaw and noted that he
was still waiting for the decree which the Emperor had given the nuncio
Malaspina. He felt that, while more complications might arise, given the good
will of Bathory, hy expected no real difficulties in reaching a final settlemene22 .
The reason that Possevino had not received the Emperor's decree was not
the customary delays; rather he was being cut out of the negotiations, largely because of rising resentment at the Imperial Court where he was seen as partial to
the Polish King. The Venetian Ambassador at Prague reported on January 15 the
dissatisfaction there over Possevino's partiality 223. The Jesuit Marcus Pitacic at
Prague reported to his Provincial similar accusations being made by court offi-

15 January 1585: MPV VII, 580.
•
Ibid., 604-605. There is a copy of the decree among Possevino' s papers, ARSI Opp. NN. 330
233. Zane noted (5 February 1585) that the decree got around explicitly allowing hereditary
claims in the female line but in fact yielded to the substance of Polish King's demand. Zane, who
only a month earlier had been making pessimistic reports, thought the decree should establish solid :£eace and good relations between the monarchs. KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY , 204.
2
MPV VII, 420.
221 The dispatch was drawn up iiI several stages (Februrary 24 to March 7). The final document
settling the disputed and signed by Bathory and Berzeviczy (6 July 1585) closely parallels Bolognetti's dispatch: ibid., 648-655.
222 Ibid., 624.
223 KARPATHY-KRAvJANSZKY, 204.
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cials224 . He was not the only Jesuit maki~g such reports225. Cutting Possevino out
of the final phase of the negotiations seems to have heen done at the request of
the Emperor or of his officials, who may have felt he was usurping their role in
the negotiations. The negotiations henceforward were to be facilitated by the
regular nuncios Bolognetti and Malaspina, even though Cardinal Bolognetti was
also suspected at the Imperial Court of partiality toward BMhory and was scheduled to be replaced in March by the new 'nuncio to Poland 226 . While defending
Possevino against the accusations of Jesuits in Prague and Vienna, the Jesuit
General Claudio Acquaviva227 went to Cardinal Gallio and asked that henceforward Possevino confine his work as nuncio to the several papal seminaries he
had helped to found in northern and eastern Europe. Gallio took the matter to
Gregory XIII, who agreed to this arrangement. On Februrary 9 Gallio wrote Possevino and asked him to put aside the Szatmar dispute and go to Braunsberg
(Braniewo) where he was to await priests being sent from Rome for work in
Sweden 228 .
There can be little doubt that Possevino admired the energetic Bathory
more than the enigmatic Rudolf, a preference shared by most historians. He
certainly developed a closer working relationship with the Polish King than
with the Emperor. Early in the negotiations Possevino complained about the
procrastination of the Imperial bureaucracy, as did many others, but in the later
stages of the negotiations it was Bathory's stubbornness and touchiness over
his dignity that had become the roadblock to a solution, and Possevino had
worked hard to bring the King to accept the Imperial compensation as an offer
made in good faith. Paramount always for Possevino in the negotiations were
the twin goals of Gregory XIII: harmony between the two great Catholic monar-

224 Pitacic to Henricus Blyssem, February 1585: LuKAcs II, 767-769, 16*. Pitacic was born at
Sisak, Croatia, c. 1548, entered the Society 18 August 1566 at Vienna, and died 13 January 1608
at Ebemdorf. Blyssem was born at Bonn, Germany, c. 1530, entered the Society in Rome in 1555,
and died 24 April 1586 at Graz.
.
225 Ioannes Nicholas Donius [born c. 1538 in Baelen-sur-Nethe, Belgium; entered the Society 1
July 1556 at Cologne; died 4 April 1594 at Vienna], the Jesuit rector at Vienna, reported to the Jesuit General Claudio Acquaviva that the Imperial Vice Chancellor Schelm was calling Possevino
unsteady, inconsistent and a traitor to the Emperor; 11 February 1585: ibid., 769. Acquaviva replied with a defense of Possevino, but indicated that he hoped that Possevino would soon be released from his diplomatic activities, something that Possevino himself had repeatedly requested
of Acquaviva: ibid.
226 Zane 's dispatch of 15 January 1585: KARPATHY-KRAVJANSZKY, 204.
227 Acquaviva was born 14 September 1543 at Atri, entered the Society at Rome 12 iuly 1567,
was elected General 19 February 1581, and died 31 January 1615 at Rome.
228 Acquaviva to Father Gregor Roseff (born 22 July 1538 at Landshut; entered Society 15 September 1559 at Vienna; died 15 February 1623 at Augsburg), rector at the Imperial college, 21
February 1585; LuKAcs, II, 832n; the Polish Provincial, Giovanni Paolo Campa no (born 25 January 1540 at Reggio Emilia; entered Society 15 September 1563 at Rome; died 27 April 1592 at
Rome), who much admired Possevino, defended Possevino in letters to Acquaviva, 27 February
and 1 March 1585: ibid., 832n and 836n. Acquaviva's decision to petition Gregory XIII for Possevino's removal from the negotiations was probably motivated by fear that hostility to Possevino
might foster a general hostility to Jesuits at the Imperial court. For Gallio's letter to Possevino:
Opp. NN. 330 245.
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chs of eastern Europe and the projected alliance against the Turks. His personal
admiration for Bathory was totally subordinate to these major ends.
Possevino blamed Malaspina and others for stirring up the hostility at the
Imperial court that led to his dismissal. He traced that hostility to his having rebuffed Malaspina when the nuncio made accusations of avarice and peculation
against the previous nuncio, Bonomi. Possevino also felt that Malaspina resented his prominent role in the negotiations, even though he was a mere priest
and not a bishop like the other nuncios229. Given the hostility toward him both by
Malaspina at Prague and by Bolognetti at the Polish court230, Possevino had become a liability to papal diplomacy, even though he had the best knowledge of
the whole Szatmar dispute and still enjoyed Bathory's favor.
On February 27 Possevino wrote a long letter to Malaspina 23 1. It is polite on
the surface, but at points Possevino's resentment emerges, especially when he
notes that he was deliberately prevented from seeing the most recent documents
from Prague about the negotiations. In fact, Bathory himself had informed him
about their contents. Possevino took pride in the fact that his phrasing had been
used to get around the problem of inheritance through the female line and that he
knew the territories in question better than the court officials in Prague, thanks to
his personal inspection of the places in question during his tour of Transylvania.
He made a point of his papal authorization to carryon the negotiations-his letter
suggests that he had not yet received notice of his dismissal. But he did acknowledge several times that he was held in suspicion by officials at the Imperial
court232 .
In fact Possevino kept in contact with Bathory on the negotiations: at the
end of February, just before departing for Braunsberg, he wrote the King that «I
no longer doubt that the whole business will be carried to an excellent outcome».
He went on to encourage Bathory to cultivate the Emperor's friendship since
will bear «richer' fruit for the Christian commonwealth»233. Bathory replied that
Possevino letter was «most welcome to us» and that as he had often told Possevino, he would not allow Rudolf to surpass him in generosity and that the
agreement with the Emperor will be confirmed and that he was now much more
certain of his goodwill and that he was sending the Emperor delegation to work
on the friendship pact 234 .
THE FINAL AGREEMENT

Although Possevino did not participate in the final negotiations, they were
soon complete very much in accord with the arrangements he had labored so

229 Possevino defended himself and made charges against Malaspina in a letter to Acquaviva,
27 August 1585: LuKAcs II, 832-836.
230 MPV VII, 749-768.
231 ASV Nunz. Germ. 95 247-250.
232 Ibid., 247.
233 Opp. NN. 330 249.
.
234 Ibid., 251. Dated the end of February. On May 7 Zane reported to the Venetian government
that Rudolf, in agreement with Archduke Ernest and the Hungarian Council, had accepted «all the
conditions [presumably Berzeviczy' s emendations] requested by the King of Poland in recompense for Szatmar». KARPATHY-KRAvJANsZKY, 208.
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long to work out between the two monarchs. Long as the Szatmar negotiations
had lasted, they took less time than the agreement between Argentina and Chile
noted at the beginning of this essay. Two documents state the conditions of the
final agreement, both nearly identical in content. The first was signed by Rudolf
on 22 June 1585 235 . The second by Bathory on July 6236 . The documents implicitly
allow continuous possession by the BMhory family through both male and female lines. The Polish document alludes to a friendship pact as a motive for the
agreement 237 . In return for all claims to Szatmar and Nemethy Bathory on behalf
of his family in perpetuity accepted the city of Nagybanya along with the town
and villages pertaining to it and all their emoluments on the traditional basis of
ownership. To these were added the villages of Zazar, Bozonta and Totfalu but
subject to the same obligations as other Hungarian vassals toward the Habsburgs
but without an oath or act of homage on investiture. On the extinction of the
Bathory line, the lands were to return to the Hungarian crown. In addition to
those three villages listed above, five more were added (Zinirwarallia, Parlag,
Wywaras, Felseofalw and Buli). For these five villages the Bathory family was
to pay the usual tribute 238 • The formal investiture ceremony took place at Nagybanya on August 20. Rudolf was represented by Count Franz von Revay and
Franz Nagyvati. BMhory's delegation was led by Martin Berzeviczy, the chancellor of Transylvania 239 .
The actual transfer of land held little historical import. The long delays in
reaching the agreement were, however, disastrous for Gregory XIII's hopes of a
Balkan crusade against the still menacing Ottoman Empire. The early 1580s presented the Christian powers with a rare opportunity, since the Turks were engaged in a protracted war (1577-1590) on their eastern flank against the Persians 24o. Stephan Bathory was a gifted military commander, as was his chancellor
Zamoyski. On 15 May 1585 BMhory fell into deep depression, mainly over a rebuff by the Polish parliament, but the long and frustrating Szatmar negotiations
undoubtedly contributed to his psychological deterioration. The depression continued almost down till his sudden death 12 December 1586241 . Seven years later
Rudolf became engaged in a long and unsuccessful war (1593-1606) against the
Turks in which Sigismund Bathory, Stephan's successor as Prince of Transylvania, sided with Rudolf. But he neither had Stephan's military gifts, nor was he he

Printed in Gooss, 210-21l.
Ibid., 211-214.
237 « ••• Maiestas eius Caesarea ut suum vicissim animum uti integerrimum, ita huiusmodi mutuam ac verum benevolentiam atque amicitiam stabiliendam, non minus propensum, quam publici boni et tranquillitatis studiosissimum, testatum redderet, eo condescendit, ut huiusmodi compensationis medio locum assenserit». Ibid., 212.
238 Ibid., 213-214.
239 For the Imperial document, ibid., 215-216. For that of Biithory 's representatives, ibid.,
216-218.
240 In a letter to Cardinal Gallio (27 August 1583) Bolognetti expressed optimism about a successful crusade in the Balkans. MPV VI, 499-502.
241 DAVIES, I, 432.
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King of Poland 242 • In 1597 Sigismund resigned his lands in favor of Rudolf; imperial occupation set off intense opposition and Sigismund attempted a futile
comeback, only to resign again in 1599243.
SUMARIO
Gregorio XlII abrigaba la esperanza de unir Venecia, el Emperador Rodolfo II y Esteban Bathory de Polonia, en una alianza contra los turcos, pero Bathory insistia en que
Rodolfo Ie devolviese sus tierras ancestrales (Szatmar y Nemethy), que Maximiliano II Ie
habia quitado en 1561; Maximiliano, de 1565 a 1567, tuvo prisionero a Biithory, aun
cuando se trataba de un embajador. Mas tarde Bathory fue elegido principe de Transilvania (1571) y rey de Polonia (1576). Tras la negociaci6n de paz entre Polonia y Moscovia,
lIevada a cabo por Possevino, Bathory volvi6 a sus antiguas reclamaciones ancestrales, y
una guerra contra Rodolfo II parecfa inminente, la cual destruiria las esperanzas del papado de una liga contra el Turco. Possevino desempeii6 el papel mas importante como
mediad or en unas lentas negociaciones que se extendieron desde 1582 hasta 1585. Anteriores historiadores prficticamente hicieron caso omiso de estas negociaciones, aunque
elias dejaron centenares de documentos.
Gregorio XlII nombr6 a Possevino mediador, a instancias de Biithory. Possevino urgi6 a Bathory a aceptar una compensaci6n altern at iva, si el Emperador no Ie .devolvia sus
tierras ancestrales en Transilvania. Aunque Bathory suscit6 el espectro de la guerra, esto
no pasaba de ser sino una amenaza vacfa, pues no era probable que el Parlamento polaco
apoyara una guerra para conseguir unas tierras en Transilvania. En junio de 1581, Possevino mantuvo consultas con Rodolfo y sus principales consejeros. Rodolfo aceptaba la
mediaci6n papal pero rechazaba las reivindicaciones de Bathory - Szatmar era una conquista legitima en tiempo de guerra - pero insistia en que deseaba la paz y la amistad con
el Rey polaco, y abrfa la puerta a una compensaci6n alternativa. Pero i,cual iba a ser, y en
que consistirfa, esta compensaci6n? Sobre esto giraron interrninablemente las negociaciones durante tres aiios. A complicar mas las' negociaciones sobre una justa compensaci6n,
vino a sumarse un pacto de amistad y comercio que ambos monarcas querian, y la convicci6n de Bathory de que la Corte imperial no respetaba su dignidad. Los dos monarcas intentaron ganarse el apoyo del Sultan. Una y otra vez, Possevino tuvo que viajar desde PoIonia a Praga, para consul tar sobre las ofertas y las reivindicaciones. Asf Possevino, desde
septiembre de 1583 hasta enero de 1584, intervino en una reuni6n de delegados de ambos
monarcas en Cassovia, reuni6n, que no consigui6 apenas nada.
EI final de 1584 y los inicios de 1585 produjeron por fin una soluci6n definitiva y
amistosa. EI pacto de amistad y la compensaci6n por Szatmar no deberfan estar fntimamente relacionados entre sf. Rodolfo entreg6 Nagybanya y un numero de poblados hungaros a la familia Bathory y permiti6 que se pudiera heredar por linea femenina, pero a
Bathory no se Ie exigi6 que pronunciara un juramento de lealtad a Rodolfo a cambio de
las posesiones. Los acuerdos finales fueron firmados en Junio y Julio, y se atuvieron a las
condiciones estipuladas por Possevino, ,pero el papado, en febrero de 1585, destituy6 a
Possevino de su cargo de mediador, porque el emperador y sus consejeros crefan que era
demasiado favorable al rey polaco.

242 On the <<long» war against the Turks, see Jan Paul NIEDERKORN, Die europaischen Machte
und der «Lange Turkenkrieg» Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593-1606) (Vienna 1993) and Kenneth M.
SETION, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia 1991).
243 P.F. SUGAR, P. HANAK, and T. FRANK, editors, A History of Hungary (Bloomington 1990)
131.

